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Article
Refugee Responses, State-like Behavior, and
Accountability for Human Rights Violations:
A Case Study of Sexual Violence in Guinea's
Refugee Camps
Alice Farmert
This Article advocates for better access to justice and a more
comprehensive accountability system in refugee camps. Refugee women
are frequently subject to sexual violence and sexual exploitation in the
country of refuge, and find themselves without ways of redressing these
fundamental rights violations. This Article uses the sexual violence and
sexual exploitation that was documented in refugee camps in Guinea in
2002 as an illustrative case study of the protection problems faced by
refugee women in many parts of the world. The author argues that the
host government, UNHCR, and various non-governmental organizations
operated together to fulfill state-like functions in long-term refugee
camps, but their efforts left accountability, access to justice, and
enforcement of women's human rights laws sorely lacking. The
movement toward rights based refuge -embraced in varying forms by the
aid providers in Guinea - provides a theoretical and practical framework
for greater rights recognition, but has not yet delivered a complete
response to the specific human rights violations faced by refugee women.
If rights-based refuge is to succeed in refugee settings like Guinea, aid
providers must make the protection of women's human rights a central
t J.D., NYU School of Law, 2005; M.P.A., Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, 2005; B.A., Harvard College, 2000. This article grew out of a deeply rewarding
internship with the American Refugee Committee in Guinea in 2004. All the positions taken in
the article are my own. I am grateful for funding provided by the Carr Center for Human
Rights Policy at Harvard University. I wish to thank Philip Alston, Jacqueline Bhabha, Jeremy
Konyndyk, Seynabou Dia, William Abresch, Nehal Bhuta, Meg Satterthwaite, Smita Narula,
Corinne Dufka, and Ben Shuldiner, among many others, for their insightful comments and
invaluable support.
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concern by instituting a robust, multi-layered system of accountability to
which all refugee women have access.
INTRODUCTION
Women and girls in refugee camps around the world are deeply
vulnerable to sexual violence and sexual exploitation.1 Not only are many
of these women subject to sexual violence when fleeing their home
countries, but they find themselves in desperate need of food or shelter, in
perilous security situations, and often without the protection of family
members in their countries of refuge. Sexual violence and sexual
exploitation, which in many contexts have deep cultural roots, but which
are greatly exacerbated in the refugee setting, constitute violations of
refugee women's fundamental human rights. In emergency and post-
emergency situations, protecting the rights of refugee women is both a task
of crucial importance and a task that has not yet been adequately met.
Refugee women lack access to justice and accountability mechanisms.
Over the past decade, there have been broad attempts to incorporate
human rights norms into refugee responses. Many of the actors that
provide relief to refugees - including the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR') and a committed cadre of
international non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") - have embraced
the concept of rights-based refuge. However, rights-based refuge - which
recognizes the fundamental human dignity and rights-bearing nature of
1. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office
of Internal Oversight Services: Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in
West Africa, Supp. (No. 1), 5, U.N. Doc. A/57/1 (Oct. 11, 2002); Mike Jendrzejczyk, From
Eating Rats in North Korea to Sex Abuse in China: A Refugee Travesty, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov.
19, 2002, at 8 (discussing the vulnerability of female North Korean refugees in China, and
claiming that refugee women are sold or abducted into "sexual slavery" and frequently
subject to domestic violence); Michael Wines, Zambia's Plight Goes Begging in Year of Disasters,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at Al (discussing the ration cuts in the Nangweshi refugee camp
near the Angolan border in late 2004, and stating that "some of the women in the camps
turned to prostitution to feed their children"); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIDDEN IN PLAIN
VIEW: REFUGEES LIVING WITHOUT PROTECTION IN NAIROBI AND KAMPALA (Nov. 2002), available
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenyugan.pdf (discussing the prevalence of sexual
violence, harassment, and extortion among refugees living in Nairobi and Kampala); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, SEEKING PROTECTION: ADDRESSING SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN
TANZANIA'S REFUGEE CAMPS (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/
tanzania (alleging that Burundian refugee women confronted wide-spread sexual abuse and
domestic violence in Tanzanian refugee camps). HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SEXUAL VIOLENCE
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES AMONG DISPLACED PERSONS IN DARFUR AND CHAD: A HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH BRIEFING PAPER (Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/
darfur0505.pdf (discussing the continuing risk of rape and assault for refugee women and
girls who fled Darfur and live in refugee camps in Chad); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TRAPPED BY
INEQUALITY: BHUTANESE REFUGEE WOMEN IN NEPAL (Sept. 2003), available at http://hrw.org/
reports/2003/nepal0903/nepal0903full.pdf (examining the uneven response of UNHCR and
the government of Nepal to rape, domestic violence, sexual and physical assault, and
trafficking of girls and women from refugee camps).
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the refugee - must be interpreted in a more generous and comprehensive
manner in order to be fully effective for refugee women. Looking at rights-
based refuge through the lens of sexual violence tests the commitment of
aid providers to this re-conceptualized notion of humanitarian aid. As of
yet, rights-based refuge has not found a way to incorporate fundamental
mechanisms for accountability and access to justice. Without these crucial
tools for protecting the human rights of refugees, the movement towards
rights-based refuge remains incomplete.
The sexual violence and sexual exploitation that was documented in
refugee camps in Guinea in 20022 provides an illustrative case study of the
problems faced by refugee women in many parts of the world. During this
period, Guinea's refugees were cared for by a trio of aid providers - the
host government, UNHCR, and various NGOs - that is representative of
the actors in camp governance in many other refugee situations around the
world. In Guinea, much like in other refugee settings, this trio of aid
providers delivers a broad range of state-like functions from security to
health care. However, the trio of aid providers in Guinea in 2002 struggled
to offer strong mechanisms for accountability and access to justice. Since
2002, many aid providers in Guinea have taken positive steps towards
rights-based refuge by finding ways to redress sexual violence and sexual
exploitation. However, despite the efforts to incorporate rights-based
refuge into aid delivery, Guinea still lacks a comprehensive and durable
model for providing accountability and access to justice for refugee women
subject to sexual violence. By examining the structure of aid delivery in
Guinea, this paper aims to make the case for a more substantial
incorporation of accountability mechanisms in refugee settings around the
world.
This paper starts by giving a brief overview of the waves of refugee
flows into Guinea since 1990. I review the particular protection concerns of
refugee women and discuss the responses of the Guinean government,
UNHCR, and the NGOs working in Guinea at the time. Second, I examine
the parallel human rights initiatives of this trio of aid providers - all of
which recognize the rights-bearing nature of refugees - and argue that all
three developments lay the groundwork for rights-based refuge, but
ultimately fail to offer a complete response to the specific human rights
violations faced by refugee women.
2. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services: Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Africa, supra note
1; Refugees Describe Food-for-Sex Abuse, Associated Press, Mar. 1, 2002; Mano River Union:
Reports that Child Refugees Sexually Exploited Shock Annan, U. N. INTEGRATED REGIONAL
INFORMATION NETWORK, Feb. 27, 2002, http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportlD=23126;
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) & Save the Children - UK, Note
for Implementing and Operational Partners on Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of
Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone: Based on Initial Findings and
Recommendations from Assessment Mission 22 October - 30 November 2001, 2 (Feb. 27, 2002),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/partners/opendoc/pdf?tbl=
PARTNERS&id=3c7c89a4 [hereinafter UNHCR/ Save the Children (UK) Report].
[Vol. 9
3
Farmer: Refugee Responses, State-like Behavior, and Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Case Study of Sexual Violence in Guinea's Refugee Camps
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
2006] Refugee Responses, State-like Behavior, and Accountability 47
Third, I argue that the Guinean government, UNHCR, and the NGOs
operate together to fulfill state-like functions in the refugee camps, but that
their lack of coordination leaves accountability, access to justice, and
enforcement of women's human rights laws sorely lacking. Finally, I
conclude that if rights-based refuge is to succeed in refugee settings like
Guinea, aid providers must make the protection of women's human rights
a central concern by instituting a robust, multi-layered system of
accountability to which all refugee women have access.
I. GUINEA'S LONG-TERM REFUGEE CRISIS
A. Refugee Influxes and Long-Term Camps
Since 1991, successive waves of refugees from the West African sub-
region have poured into Guinea.3 More than 90% of these refugees -
amounting to more than 500,000 people - came from Sierra Leone or
Liberia.4 Following outbreaks of violence in 2001-2002, scores of refugees
arrived in Guinea from C6te d'Ivoire as well.5 For Guinea, a country of
around 9 million people 6 and one that ranks in the bottom 30 countries on
the human development index, 7 these refugee numbers are overwhelming.
The refugee influx in Guinea is proportional to the United States of
America absorbing more than 16 million refugees in a ten-year period.
8
As is characteristic of many refugee flows, most of the refugees
arriving in Guinea were women and young children unaccompanied by
3. UNHCR, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK: GUINEA, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/statistics/pendc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=414ad5837&page=statistics (last
visited May 8, 2005) (reporting that in 1993, there were 577,158 refugees in Guinea, primarily
from Liberia or Sierra Leone). As of 2002, there were 182,163 refugees in Guinea, primarily
from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and C6te d'Ivoire. Id. Between 2000 and 2002, there were always
more than 175,000 refugees in Guinea. Id. Between 1993 and 2000, there were always more
than 400,000 refugees in Guinea. Id.
4. Id. at 317 (indicating that in 1993, 416,064 refugees from Liberia and 161,092 refugees
from Sierra Leone were in Guinea, and in 2002, 119,293 refugees from Liberia and 60,553
refugees from Sierra Leone were in Guinea).
5. Id. (noting that in 2002, 2,188 refugees from C6te d'Ivoire were in Guinea).
6. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK: GUINEA, http://www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gv.html (last modified Jan. 10, 2006) (stating that the
population estimate as of July 2005 was 9,467,866).
7. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004: CULTURAL
LIBERTY IN TODAY'S DIVERSE WORLD, http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdrO4
complete.pdf, 31 (2004). The human development index measures a country's achievements in
terms of life expectancy, educational attainment, and adjusted real income. Guinea ranks
160th among 177 countries. Id. at 232 tbl. 27.
8. See U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK: UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html (last modified Jan.
10, 2006) (estimating approximately 300,000,000 people for the population of the United
States). The calculation in the text is reached by dividing 500,000 (an approximation of the
number of refugees in Guinea during the 1990s) by 9,000,000 (an approximation of the
Guinean population during this period) and multiplying by 300,000,000.
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male family members, because many of the men and older boys had been
recruited to fight in their home country's conflicts. 9 Many of the women
and girls who sought refuge in Guinea had been subject to extensive sexual
violence before leaving their home countries of Sierra Leone,10 Liberia,1 '
and C6te d'Ivoire.12 Guinea was under pressure to absorb huge numbers of
refugees and to do so in a way that responded adequately to the horrific
abuses the refugees had suffered before fleeing to Guinea.
Almost all of these refugees flooded into an interior, forested district
that curls southwards and juts into Sierra Leone, Liberia, and C6te d'Ivoire.
The Forest Region is primarily rural and is one of the poorest areas of
Guinea. The area, which has a population that is ethnically distinct from
the ruling Soussous13 and is geographically distant from the capital
Conakry, has not seen significant investment in public infrastructure in
decades. 14 The enormous influx of refugees exacerbated the already
alarming poverty in this part of Guinea. 5 The Forest Region does not have
the economic or environmental infrastructure to absorb large numbers of
refugees, and the increase in population rapidly led to deforestation and
competition for agricultural land.16
When the refugee crisis began in the early 1990s, many of the refugees
9. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEES, REBELS, AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE
58 (2002); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YOUTH, POVERTY, AND BLOOD: THE LETHAL LEGACY OF
WEST AFRICA'S REGIONAL WARRIORS, 27 (Mar. 2005), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/westafricaO45/westafricaO4O5.pdf (discussing the
patterns of recruitment of boys and young men during the Sierra Leonean and Liberian
conflicts in the 1990s, and noting that humanitarian workers in Guinean refugee camps
observed that an alarmingly small number of men and boys above fourteen were reaching the
camps).
10. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "WE'LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY": SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE
SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT, 25-48 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
sierraleone/sierleon0103.pdf.
11. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LIBERIAN REFUGEES IN GUINEA: REFOULEMENT,
MILITARIZATION OF CAMPS, AND OTHER PROTECTION CONCERNS, 19 (Nov. 2000), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/guinea/guinea1o2.pdf.
12. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TRAPPED BETWEEN TWO WARS: VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS
IN WESTERN COTE D'IVOIRE, 28 (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
cotedivoire08O3/cotedivoireO8O3.pdf.
13. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: GUINEA 2004,
(Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41607.htm. President Lansana
Cont6 and most of his senior officials are ethnically Soussou, a minority tribe in Guinea. Id.
14. Guinea: Further Economic Decline Expected as Donors Quit, U. N. INTEGRATED REGIONAL
INFORMATION NETWORK, June 29, 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportlD=41918
("In the remote Forest Region, in southern Guinea, the last public investment in hydraulic and
electric services or highway infrastructures was in 1961. Since then, the population of the
region has increased by five.").
15. See generally GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARM: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE
GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS 148-49 (1993) [hereinafter LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARTY] (discussing
the detrimental effects of large refugee influxes in poor countries of first asylum).
16. Id.; UNHCR, Economic and Social Impact of Massive Refugee Populations on Host
Developing Countries as well as Other Countries, 11, U.N. Doc. EC/54/SC/CRP.5 (Feb. 18,
2004), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/excom/opendoc.pdf?tbl=
EXCOM&id=403dcdc64.
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in the Forest Region were absorbed into local villages.
17 During this period,
the impact on the host population was relatively positive. For instance, as
the public health specialist Wim Van Damme argues, while refugees were
largely living among the host community, the provision of health services
to refugees also benefited the host community.
18 As the refugee influx
grew, however, and the numbers became overwhelming, many refugees
gravitated toward UNHCR camps. Initially, these camps were mostly
along the borders, dangerously close to the violence from which the
refugees had fled. Some refugees, mostly men with marketable skills,
continued to live in the towns of N'Z~r~kor6, Macenta, and Gu~ckedou, or
in nearby villages. However, because many of the refugees were women
traveling alone or with young children, they lacked the resources or skills
to find means of survival outside the camps. The wars in Liberia and
Sierra Leone continued unabated, and so by the late 1990s the camps had
become semi-permanent, long-term settlements for hundreds of thousands
of people. As with many other refugee situations, finding a permanent, or
"durable," solution to this refugee crisis eluded the political actors in the
field.19 The Guinean government, like many other host governments in
countries of first asylum, was deeply reluctant to accept the refugees as
permanent citizens.20
As more refugees arrived in Guinea, tension between hosts and
refugees increased, a phenomenon that had a particularly severe impact on
refugee women. The government took various measures hostile to refugee
protection, periodically closing the borders to Sierra Leone and Liberia.
21
Resentment among the host communities increased in part because
refugees in camps had greater access than Guineans to resources, such as
income generating loans, food distribution, and primary education, that
lead to the realization of social and economic rights.32
17. Wim Van Damme, Do Refugees Belong in Camps? Experiences from Goma and Guinea, 346
THE LANCET 360, 361 (1995).
18. Wim Van Damme et al., Effects of a Refugee-Assistance Programme on Host Populations in
Guinea as Measured by Obstetric Interventions, 351 THE LANCET 1609 (1998).
19. U.N. Commissioner for Refugees Executive Comm. Programme, "Protracted Refugee
Situations," 4, U.N. Doc. EC/54/SC/CRP.14 (June 10, '2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/excom/opendoc.pdf?tbl=EXCOM&id=
4 c9 8 2 17 2
(attributing the protracted refugee situations in Guinea and elsewhere to "political
impasses").
20. See generally GIL LOESCHER, THE UNHCR AND WORLD POLICS: A PERILOUS PATH 351
(2001) (discussing the increasing reluctance on the part of countries of first asylum to see local
integration as a viable permanent solution to refugee crises).
21. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 60 (describing arrests and
refoulement of suspected rebels and adult members of their families at the border with Sierra
Leone in 1998 and stating that independent observers from UNHCR, the International
Committee of the Red Cross or elsewhere were not permitted to observe these operations); see
also id. at 74 (discussing the ramifications of these border closings on refugee protection).
22. Jeremy Konyndyk, Towards a New Model for Post-Emergency Refugee Assistance,
HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK, www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2745 (last visited
February 27, 2006) (arguing that "emergency-level services" provided to refugees exceed the
resources available to the host population and that provision of these services increases
6
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The deterioration in host-refugee relations accelerated when militia
violence in the neighboring countries bled over the border in late 2000.
Violence had initially spilled over into Guinea in mid-1998, and hit-and-
run raids took place throughout 1999.23 In late 2000, these attacks took on a
"new level of intensity and sophistication" when intense fighting broke out
on both sides of the Liberian-Guinean border near Guckedou. 24 These
cross-border incursions further disrupted life in the Forest Region of
Guinea,25 leading to fatalities, injuries, and sexual crimes against women.
In addition, the incursions caused considerable internal displacement of
both Guinean nationals and refugees. 26 The violence caused major
economic disruption and compounded domestic instability. 27 In September
2000, Guinean president Lansana Cont6 appeared on radio and television
and issued a public plea to protect the country from rebel attacks. 28 As a
result, mobs in Conakry attacked and raped Sierra Leonean refugee
women living in the capital city.29
After the incursions in 2000-2001, UNHCR became increasingly
concerned about deteriorating security in the camps near the borders.30
Throughout 2000, the Guinean camps had been infiltrated by rebel
groups.31 One particular cross-border attack in 2000 - in which one
tensions with the host communities); see also UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit,
Working Paper: When is a Refugee not a Refugee? Flexible Social Categories and Host/Refugee
Relations in Guinea (March 2003) (prepared by B. Lacey Andrews) (analyzing the economic and
social benefits in the camps and suggesting that the International Rescue Committee schools
in the refugee camps are actually pull factors for those considering migration from Liberia).
23. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 65-66 (detailing incidents in
which elements of the Sierra Leonean RUF stormed villages in Guinea).
24. Id. at 73.
25. UN Reports Accuse Guinea of Violating Arms Embargo on Liberia, BBC MONITORING
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Nov. 2, 2002 ("The Liberian civil war has claimed tens of thousands
of lives and caused hundreds of thousands of refugees. There have been several incursions
into Guinea, which have claimed lives and caused material damage in the neighbouring
divisions.").
26. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUINEA, LIBERIA, AND SIERRA LEONE: A HUMAN RIGHTS
CRISIS FOR REFUGEES AND THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED 1-2 (2001), http://web.amnesty.org/
library/print/ENGAFR050052001.
27. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK: GUINEA, supra note 6.
28. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Refugee Women in Guinea Raped (Sept. 13,
2000), http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2000/O9/13/guinea760.htm; see also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, TESTIMONIES FROM SIERRA LEONEAN REFUGEES IN CONAKRY, GUINEA (Sept.
2001), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2000/09/O1/sierra3O97.htm.
29. Human Rights Watch, Refugee Women in Guinea Raped, supra note 28; Human Rights
Watch, Testimonies from Sierra Leonean Refugees in Conakry, Guinea, supra note 28.
30. UNHCR, Guinea: Relocation from Border Camps: a Summary of Comments by UNHCR
Spokesperson Ron Redmond, (2000), http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.
htm?tbl=NEWS&page=home&ID=3ae6b82678.
31. See UNHCR, Possible Militia Recruitment in Guinea Camps Seen as Threat to Refugees,
UNHCR UPDATE, Jan. 25, 2001, http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.
pdf?tbl=NEWS&id=3ae6b807c (discussing militia presence in camps near Guckedou,
including the Nyaedou camp); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LIBERIAN REFUGEES IN GUINEA, supra
note 11 (documenting the presence of LURD combatants and weapons within Kouankan
Camp near the border town of Macenta); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YOUTH, POVERTY, AND
7
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UNHCR international staffer was killed and another abducted - spurred
UNHCR to begin relocating the camps.
32 Not all refugees were willing to
relocate, fearing the hostility of Guineans farther from the borders.
33 In
addition, the Guinean government was reluctant to permit further
movement of Liberian refugees to the interior of the country.
34
Nonetheless, during 2001-2002, UNHCR moved the majority of camp-
based refugees to new camps away from the borders.
35
Three different groups provided aid to refugees in Guinea throughout
this period: the Guinean government, UNHCR, and various NGOs. As
more and more refugees were settled in camps, this aid took on a long-
term character. The camps became the equivalent of small towns, with
sophisticated community-service structures, including schools,
marketplaces, hospitals, and income-generating opportunities.
36 But the
trio of aid providers still managed the camps in an emergency framework
(for instance, by preventing agricultural cultivation). Such a framework is
damaging to the long-term welfare of refugees who remain in camps for
years, in part because it discourages the development of economic self-
sufficiency.
37
BLOOD: THE LETHAL LEGACY OF WEST AFRICA'S REGIONAL WARRIORS, supra note 9 (describing
interviews with combatants who had been recruited from camps in Guinea).
32. Alexander G. Higgins, UN Said One Staffer Killed, Second Missing in Guinea, Associated
Press, Sept. 18, 2000, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/artcile.cgi?file=/news/
archive/2000/09/18/intemationa0004EDT0400.DTL.
33. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GUINEA: REFUGEES STILL AT RISK: CONTINUING
PROTECTION CONCERNS IN GUINEA, 3 (Jul. 2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2001/guinea/guinea0701.PDF (stating that some refugees chose to remain closer to the border
in order to be able to flee reprisal attacks from Guinean nationals).
34. Guinea Moves Liberia's New Refugees into Camps Further Inland, UNHCR NEWS STORIES,
Aug. 7, 2002 ("After weeks of negotiations, UNHCR and the Guinean government have finally
agreed to move more than 1,000 Liberian refugees living near the unsafe border in southern
Guinea further inland to camps in Albadaria.").
35. Compare UNHCR, Guinea as of 09 May, 2001, http://reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/
db900LargeMaps/SKAR_64GDRZ?OpenDocument&cc=gin&rc=1 (showing refugee camps
and potential resettlement sites in 2001), with UNHCR, Guinde: Situation des Rdfugids Sierra
Ldonais et Libdriens (October 2001), http://reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900LargeMaps/
SKAR-64GBKU?OpenDocument&cc=gin (demonstrating the relocation of Liberian refugees to
camps further from the border). For a depiction of the camp locations in Guinea as of 2004,
see UNHCR, UNHCR Presence in West Africa: Refugee and Returnee Estimates (Apr. 1, 2004),
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SKAR-64GC2E?OpenDocument. By
March 2004, UNHCR was operating six main camps in the forest region: three in the
Kissidougou/ Albadaria region (Kountaya, Boreah, and Telikoro), two near N'Zrkor6
(Lains and Kola), and the Kouankan camp near Macenta. Id.
36. Cf. Ralph Wilde, Note, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Why and How UNHCR
Governance of "Development" Refugee Camps Should be Subject to International Human Rights Law,
1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 107,108-09 (1998) (describing the Dadaab camps in Kenya).
37. Konyndyk, supra note 22 (arguing that "the sustained provision of free services after
the emergency phase... erodes refugees' livelihoods mechanisms.... over time these unused
[ob] skills deteriorate and are forgotten"); Gil Loescher, UNHCR at Fifty: Refugee Protection and
World Politics, in PROBLEMS OF PROTECTION: THE UNHCR, REFUGEES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 10
(Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney, & Gil Loescher eds., 2003) [hereinafter Loescher, UNHCR at
Fifty] (arguing that in the 1990s, UNHCR focused "almost entirely" on repatriation, ignoring
8
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In 2002, when the reports on sexual violence in Guinean refugee camps
came to light, it became clear that the camp construction and operation had
systematically disadvantaged women and left them vulnerable to sexual
violence.38 For instance, when the new camps were established, families of
refugees were given a plot of land and materials with which to build
shelters. Women without male family members had to rely on NGO staff
and other refugees for construction assistance.39 Other aspects of the camp
design, such as water-gathering points and food distribution methods,
exacerbated the extent to which women had to rely on men for assistance,
thereby making them more vulnerable. 40 Job opportunities in the camps
usually went to men, leaving women without independent means of
income.41 Although refugee women had been settled in these camps for
years, aid providers did little to redesign operations to reduce
vulnerability. Since 2002, some NGOs implemented micro-enterprise
schemes and other income generating projects focusing on women's self-
sufficiency. 42 However welcome these efforts are, they are only the first
step in a systematic and comprehensive solution to refugee women's
vulnerability.
Given that there were very few long-term solutions for these refugee
women while wars were raging in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the camps
effectively functioned as long-term settlements.43 None of the three
traditional "durable solutions" used by UNHCR - return, resettlement, or
local integration - were viable long-term solutions for most refugee women
in Guinea during this period.44 For almost a decade, return to Sierra Leone
and Liberia was blocked by ongoing war. Global awareness of the needs of
other possible solutions such as local integration projects, educational programs and income-
generating projects, "often to the detriment of refugees").
38. UNHCR & WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, RESPECT OUR
RIGHTS: PARTNERSHIP FOR EQUALITY - REPORT ON THE DIALOGUE WITH REFUGEE WOMEN 26
(2001) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE DIALOGUE WITH REFUGEE WOMEN] (reporting on the
UNHCR consultation in Guinea, and stating that women were left out of planning,
implementing, and operating camps).
39. Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services:
Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Afica, supra note 1, 25.
40. UNHCR, REPORT ON THE DIALOGUE WiTH REFUGEE WOMEN, supra note 38, at 26
(stating that water points in Guinean camps were often controlled by men, frequently
resulting in physical attacks on women and girls as they fetched water, and also indicating
that women faced increased vulnerability when food aid was distributed through refugee
committees or through male heads of household).
41. Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services:
Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Africa, supra note 1,
22(b).
42. Konyndyk, supra note 22 (discussing the micro-enterprise development activities of
the American Refugee Committee and other NGOs in Guinea).
43. See LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY, supra note 15, at 148-49 (discussing the general lack of
durable solutions to modern refugee crises).
44. Id. (noting that the three traditional solutions are resettlement, local integration, and
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West African refugee populations was low, and as long as there was no
ideological or political purpose to their admission, many refugees from the
West African sub-region remained outside the scope of resettlement.
45
Language barriers and escalating tension between refugee and host
populations made local integration hard.
46 While a small handful of the
most vulnerable refugees were resettled in Western countries, and some of
the best-educated refugees (mostly men) were integrated into francophone
Guinean society, most women and girls were left to languish in camp
environments. With durable solutions elusive, the camps took on the
character of long-term settlements.
B. Consistent Violations of the Rights of Refugee Women
Guinea's long-term camps, like many other refugee camps, are
unstable environments where altered economic and social factors
aggravate women's existing cultural vulnerabilities to sexual exploitation.
47
In early 2002, the extent of sexual exploitation in Guinea's refugee camps -
and the fact that some aid workers were among the perpetrators - caught
the eye of the international press.
48 Two reports released in 2002 - one by
UNHCR/Save the Children (UK),
49 and one by the United Nations Office
of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)
50 - detailed specific cases of
adolescent sexual exploitation perpetrated by aid workers. The
UNHCR/Save the Children (UK) report accused sixty-seven aid workers
from forty-two aid organizations of perpetrating sexual violence against
young girls.51 The workers were accused of demanding sex from refugees
in exchange for food or services.
In response to the UNHCR/ Save the Children (UK) report, OIOS
45. See THOMAS SPIJKERBOER, GENDER AND REFUGEE STATUS (2000) (arguing that Western
countries are taking on increasingly hostile attitudes to refugee resettlement).
46. See, e.g., Konyndyk, supra note 22 ("While refugees receive extensive support from
humanitarian agencies, impoverished Guineans in nearby villages have little food, low-
quality health care and under-resourced schools. This has caused resentment between the host
and refugee populations, leading to violence on a number of occasions.").
47. See JENNIFER HYNDMAN, Managing Difference: Gender and Culture in Humanitarian
Emergencies, in MANAGING DISPLACEMENT: REFUGEES AND THE POLITICS OF HUMANITARIANISM
(2000) (discussing the prevalence of gender-based violence in refugee camps); Report of the
Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services: Investigation into
Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Africa, supra note 1 (discussing sexual
violence in refugee and IDP camps in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and other parts of the
West African sub-region); see also UNHCR/Save the Children (UK) Report, supra note 2.
48. See, e.g., Refugees Describe Food-for-Sex Abuse, Associated Press, supra note 2; Mano River
Union: Reports that Child Refugees Sexually Exploited Shock Annan, U. N. INTEGRATED REGIONAL
INFORMATION NETWORK, supra note 2.
49. UNHCR/ Save the Children (UK) Report, supra note 47, at 4.
50. Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services:
Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Africa, supra note 1, at 6-
11.
51. UNHCR/ Save the Children (UK) Report, supra note 2, at 2.
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conducted an in-depth investigation into allegations of sexual exploitation
throughout the West African sub-region. 52 In spite of its critique of the
methodology and conclusions of the UNHCR/ Save the Children (UK)
report, the 010S report also found cases of sexual exploitation of refugees
by aid workers, albeit much reduced compared to the allegations in the
UNHCR/ Save the Children (UK) report.53 The OOS report looked at
forty-three cases in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, 54 and found that ten
cases could be substantiated against aid workers (one United Nations
Volunteer, one peacekeeper, and eight NGO workers).55 OOS concluded
that, although it could not independently verify the cases in the UNHCR/
Save the Children (UK) report, there was considerable cause for concern.5 6
OOS pointed to reports from groups of unconnected refugees and
internally displaced people spread throughout the region as evidence that
sexual exploitation was a problem in the camps.57
Although crimes such as these are chronically underreported, legal aid
workers in Guinea during this period found that many women and girls
traded sex for basic necessities, such as food or plastic sheeting, while
others were sexually assaulted in isolated areas of the camp, and still
others were subject to domestic violence.54 The refugees most vulnerable to
sexual exploitation were women traveling alone, women as single heads of
families, children in child-headed households, children in single-parent
households, and orphaned children. The majority of children involved
were girls between the ages of 13 and 18.59
Sexual exploitation and sexual assault are violations of the
fundamental human right to personal security. 60 This right is detailed in
52. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services: Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Africa, supra note
1.
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 8 ("The fact that the consultants heard sexual exploitation stories from groups of
unconnected people, spread across three countries, gives some credibility to the issue even if
the specific allegations could not be verified.").
58. See AMERICAN REFUGEE COMMITTEE INT'L, GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE: A PARTICIPATORY
TOOLKIT, 6 (2005) ("few actual numbers are known, although reports of rape, sexual
exploitation, sexual bartering, domestic violence, and other forms of GBV are increasingly
surfacing in conflict and displaced settings."). Precise statistics on the extent of sexual violence
in Guinea's refugee camps are hard to locate. Id. However, the American Refugee
Committee's Legal Aid Clinics for Women, which serve refugee women in Guinea only,
process between 400 to 600 cases of physical and sexual violence, exploitation, child
prostitution, forced prostitution, threats, paternity suits, and child custody cases per year. Id.
at 8. Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES AMONG DISPLACED
PERSONS IN DARFUR AND CHAD, supra note 1, at 5-9 (presenting evidence that Sudanese
women and girls in Chad are frequently assaulted when they leave displaced persons camps
to collect firewood or water).
59. UNHCR/ Save the Children (UK) Report, supra note 2, at 3-4.
60. Conclusion on the International Protection of Refugees, U.N. High Commissioner for
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child, and the Convention on the Status of Refugees.
61 The UNHCR
Executive Committee acknowledges that violations of this fundamental
right inflict serious harm and injury on the victims, their families, and their
communities.62 Refugees do not forfeit this basic human right when they
cross a national border, and they should be able to enjoy their rights to life
and security of person regardless. 63 Furthermore, the exploitation is in
some cases a violation of Guinean penal law, though victims often
encounter serious practical obstacles when trying to assert their rights in
Guinean courts.64
Desperate need - in addition to underlying cultural factors - was at the
root of much of the sexual exploitation and domestic violence in Guinean
camps in 2002. The UNHCR/ Save the Children (UK) report alleged that
women and girls exchanged sex for basic necessities. Payment was rarely
in cash terms; the victims received small "gifts" of palm oil, plastic
sheeting, ration cards, grain, or soap.
65 One young refugee mother
illustrated this dependence on exploitation by asking, "If I tell you the
name of the NGO worker I have to sex [sic] with, he will get fired, and then
how will I feed my child and myself?"
66 An NGO worker in Guinea told a
UNHCR assessment team that "no girl will get a job in this camp without
having sex with NGO workers."6
7 The OIOS Report states that some
fourteen- and fifteen-year-old girls claimed that teachers in refugee schools
gave out instruction, supplies, or grades in exchange for sex.
68 Caregivers
and family members were often aware of the exploitation, but they, like the
victims, felt it was the only way to get food and other basic necessities.
69
The perpetrators were primarily men in positions of relative power
who control access to goods and services in the camps.
70 They may have
Refugees, Executive Comm. Programme, "Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence,"
Conclusion No. 73 (XLIV), 1993, http://www.unhcr.org/cg-bin/texis/vtx/excom/opendoc.
htm?tbl=EXCOM&page=home&id=3ae68c6810.
61. See UNHCR, SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST REFUGEES, RETURNEES
AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTION AND RESPONSE 49 (May
2003) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines on Sexual Violence] (giving a full discussion of human
rights violated by sexual exploitation and sexual violence).
62. Executive Committee Conclusion No. 73 (XLIV), supra note 60, 1.
63. Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in
Which they Live, G.A. Res. 40/144, art. 5 (Dec. 13,1985), available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/40/a40r14
4 .htm.
64. See ARC IN'L, CADRE JURIDIQUE RELATIF A CERTAINES FORMES DE DISCRIMINATION ET A
LA VIOLENCE CONTRE LES FEMMES EN RPPUBLIQUE DE GUINtE (2004) [hereinafter ARC, Internal
Report] (on file with author).
65. UNHCR/ Save the Children (UK) Report, supra note 2, at 3-4.
66. Id. at 8.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services:
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included: personnel of humanitarian aid organizations; government
employees overseeing refugee affairs; security forces, including
peacekeepers; and influential members of the refugee community,
including political and religious leaders.7 Those who occupied these
positions of power were primarily men; for instance, the Guinean army
and police who were delegated to provide security to the camps were
staffed almost entirely by men. Partly owing to cultural influences, those
in positions of leadership among the refugee community were often men,
even though women made up a far larger proportion of the refugee
population. 72 While aid providers have addressed sexual violence and
sexual exploitation in Guinean camps, 73 and while the situation has
improved, there are still incidents of sexual assault74 and sexual
exploitation 75 in the camps.
C. Incomplete Nature of Aid Providers' Response
From the early 1990s until 2002, the trio of aid providers - the Guinean
government, UNHCR, and various NGOs - struggled to provide basic
humanitarian aid to these continuous waves of refugees and was unable to
redress effectively the sexual violence and sexual exploitation in the camps.
The 1951 Refugee Convention does not distinguish between individual
refugees and mass influxes, leaving the Guinean government without a
clear framework for effective aid.76 The West African states negotiated a
series of memoranda of understanding with UNHCR, permitting UNHCR
71. See generally UNHCR Guidelines on Sexual Violence, supra note 61, at 14-15
(discussing likely perpetrators of sexual violence and sexual exploitation against refugees).
72. See REPORT ON THE DIALOGUE WITH REFUGEE WOMEN, supra note 38, at 33.
73. See, e.g., ARC INT'L, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FERN HOLLAND LEGAL AID CLINIC: GBV IN
CONFLICr-AFFECTED SETTINGS, 9-12 (2005) [hereinafter ARC Int'l, Overview of the Fern
Holland Legal Aid Clinic] (detailing ways in which an NGO legal aid clinic can address sexual
exploitation and sexual violence).
74. See ARC INT'L, MULTI-SECTORAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE FOREST REGION
OF GUINEA, PROGRESS REPORT APR. - JUNE 2005, 19-20 (indicating that ARC's legal aid clinic in
Kissidougou received five new rape cases and seven new domestic violence cases in the
second quarter of 2005, while the clinic in Nzerekore received three new rape cases and forty-
three new cases of assault or beating in the same period); ARC INT'L, MULTI-SECTORAL
REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE FOREST REGION OF GUINEA, PROGRESS REPORT JULY -
SEPT. 2005, 17-19 (indicating that ARC's legal aid clinic in Kissidougou received four new rape
cases and four new domestic violence cases, whereas the clinic in Nzerekore received seven
new rape cases and thirty-five new cases of assault or beating during the third quarter of
2005).
75. See ARC INT'L, MULTI-SECTORAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE FOREST REGION
OF GUINEA PROGRESS REPORT APR. - JUNE 2005, supra note 74, at 18-19 (indicating that the ARC
legal aid clinics received three new referrals of sexual exploitation in the second quarter of
2005); ARC INT'L, MULTI-SECTORAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE FOREST REGION OF
GUINEA PROGRESS REPORT JULY - SEPT. 2005, supra note 74, at 18-19 (indicating that the ARC
legal aid clinics saw one new case of sexual exploitation during the third quarter of 2005).
76. See Tom Clark, Rights-Based Refuge, the Potential of the 1951 Convention and the Need for
Authoritative Interpretation, 16 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 584, 597 (2004).
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to assist refugees on West African territories.
77 Nonetheless, the Guinean
government still routinely took numerous measures hostile to refugee
protection.78  Aid providers faced numerous logistical difficulties
establishing the Guinean camps. Because of the cross-border violence in
2000-2001, agencies encountered major problems ensuring the security of
their workers and of the refugees. 79 UNHCR failed to provide adequate
ration and identification cards, leading to inequitable food distribution and
lack of freedom of movement.80 The inadequate provision of basic
humanitarian aid made women and girl refugees more vulnerable.
Since the reports on sexual exploitation were released, the trio of aid
providers has focused on refugee women's protection needs. Both reports
offered constructive solutions, and some recommended changes have been
implemented. For example, virtually every NGO currently operating in
the camps is required to have a sexual misconduct policy in place.
Organizations also ask their employees to sign an agreement stating that
they will abide by these policies.81 Until 2004, the International Rescue
Committee (IRC) functioned as the lead "partner" agency for gender-based
violence, providing counseling and referral services to refugee victims of
gender-based violence.82 The NGOs that work on gender-based violence
also maintain a staff of community workers in the camps near Kissidougou
and N'Z~r~kor6. Cases of sexual exploitation and sexual violence still
occur, but in reduced numbers compared to 2002.83
Women's rights are among the most under-enforced human rights
norms in Guinea's refugee camps. Sexual exploitation is rooted in tasks
that are intrinsic to the private sphere, such as food production and water-
gathering84 Because it occurs as part of these daily routines and because of
77. See, e.g., UNHCR, ECOWAS-UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding (2001),
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS&page=hme&id=
3bfa4a962.
78. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 68-74.
79. See, e.g., CARE Deplores Attack, U. N. INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK,
Sept. 18, 2000, http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=596
9 ; One UNHCR Staffer
Killed, Another Abducted in Border Attack, U. N. INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK,
Sept. 18, 2000, http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian/irin/wafrica/006/OO11.html.
80. See, e.g. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 63 (2002) (describing the
inadequate distribution of registration cards in the Guinean camps, which created problems in
distributing aid to the neediest refugees).
81. See, e.g., American Refugee Committee, Sexual Misconduct Policy (Harassment,
Exploitation and Violence), May 2004 (internal report, on file with author).
82. See http://www.theirc.org/Guinea for a current description of IRC's gender-based
violence program in Guinea (Jun. 2004).
83. See ARC INT'L, MULTI-SECrORAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REPORT APR. - JUNE
2005, supra note 74, at 18-19 (giving statistics on sexual violence cases handled by the Legal
Aid Clinic for Women in the second quarter of 2005); ARC INT'L, MULTI-SECTORAL REFUGEE
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REPORT JULY - SEPT. 2005, supra note 74, at 18-19 (giving similar
statistics for the third quarter of 2005).
84. Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services:
Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Africa, supra note 1, 22
(listing factors that can lead to sexual exploitation).
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ingrained cultural practices, sexual violence is hard to address in refugee
camps. The refugee responses enshrined in the 1951 Convention prioritize
the public sphere over the private; that division is mimicked by the
provision of aid in Guinea.85 Though aid providers have taken major
strides in combating sexual exploitation and sexual violence since 2002,
more can be done. A more accountable refugee response system that offers
refugee women access to justice is greatly needed.
II. AID PROVIDERS: PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS AND PARALLEL FAILURES
Over the last two decades, each member of the trio of aid providers in
Guinea has moved toward greater incorporation of human rights norms in
refugee responses. For all three, these movements have had some, albeit
limited, impact on refugee rights. However, there remain serious obstacles
to effective rights-based refuge both at the structural level and in
enforcement. This is particularly true for women's rights, one of the first
areas traded away or marginalized when under political, economic, or
socio-cultural pressure.
A. The Guinean Government
Since ratifying the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) on September 8, 1982,86 Guinea
has taken steps towards incorporating women's rights norms in pieces of
national legislation that affect refugee women.87 Non-discrimination takes
a central place in Guinea's Constitution, which was adopted in 1990. 88
Under the Guinean Constitution, international treaties supercede national
laws89 and can be invoked in courts without having been directly
85. See Joseph Oloka-Onyango, The Plight of the Larger Half. Human Rights, Gender Violence
and the Legal Status of Refugee and Internally Displaced Women in Africa, 24 DENV. J. INT'L LAW &
POL'Y 349, 364 (1996).
86. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (Jun. 9, 2004) available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
87. See Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, 184 (3rd ed. 1995) (discussing the manner in which UN human
rights treaties obligate signatory states to make substantial changes in their own domestic
legal regimes to bring them into conformity with international norms).
88. LoI FONDAMENTALE [Constitution] prambule (Guinea). ("The People of Guinea
proclaim.., the equality and solidarity of all nationals, without distinctions of race, ethnicity,
sex, origin, religion, or opinion .... ); LOI FONDAMENTALE [Constitution] art. 8 (Guinea). ("All
human beings are equal before the law. Men and women have equal rights. No one may be
privileged or disadvantaged because of their gender.").
89. LOI FONDAMENTALE [Constitution] art. 79 (Guinea). ("Treaties and accords that were
properly approved or ratified have, upon their publication, an authority superior to that of the
laws, subject to reciprocity.").
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integrated into domestic law.90 Consequently, according to the law, women
in Guinea's jurisdiction have the same access to courts as men.
91 In
addition, under article 24 of CEDAW, Guinea is obliged to adopt all
necessary measures in order to bring its domestic laws in line with the
standards promulgated in the Convention.92 These non-discrimination
provisions have great potential to benefit refugee women.
Guinea's civil and criminal codes contain a number of provisions that
offer redress for women - including refugee women - who are subject to
sexual violence or sexual exploitation. The Constitution enumerates the
right to "physical integrity" but without addressing women specifically.
93
Rape is criminalized, punishable by 5-20 years of imprisonment.94
Prostitution is not criminalized, but pimping or otherwise profiting from
prostitution is.95 Likewise, forced prostitution - which in the legal
definition amounts to sexual exploitation - is criminal.96 Domestic violence
is illegal, but only prosecuted to the extent that the victim requests.
97
By law, these criminal provisions should offer equal redress to refugee
women and to Guinean women. Refugees are subject to the jurisdiction of
the host country. According to the 1951 Convention, refugee women
should have free and full access to the Guinean courts in order to seek the
enforcement of these provisions.9 8 The Guinean government, however,
may be hesitant to enforce the rights of women refugees, because it
sometimes perceives them more as perpetrators than as victims.99
In reality, the promulgation of laws related to CEDAW spurred a
nascent awareness of women's rights in Guinea. Guinea established a
women's affairs ministry in 1992, which aims in part to promulgate and
90. ARC, Internal Report, supra note 64, at 14 ("International provisions can be invoked
before courts or administrative bodies, and they can be applied directly without being
integrated by writing into national legislation or administrative regulations.").
91. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art 15,
Dec. 18. 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
92. Id. art. 24 ("States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the national
level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Convention.").
93. Lo! FONDAMENTALE [Constitution], art. 6. (Guinea). ("A person has the right to free
development of his personality. He has the right to life and to physical integrity. No one can
be subject to torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.").
94. CODE PtNAL art. 321 (Guinea).
95. Id. art. 326.
96. Id. art. 327. Circumstances that amount to forced prostitution include paying for sex
with a minor child, abusing a relationship of authority as a teacher or government official, or
engaging in prostitution while armed. Id.
97. Id. arts. 303-305.
98. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 16, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150,
164.
99. See, e.g., Initial Report of Guinea, U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, at 34, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GIN/1 (Mar. 6, 2001), available at,
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord200l/documentation/tbodies/cedaw-c-gin-1-3.htm
(discussing forced immigration as one factor that has contributed to the sharp rise in
prostitution in Guinea in the past decade).
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promote the enforcement of women's rights laws.100 In addition, Guinea's
2000 periodic report to the CEDAW committee acknowledges, and
commits the government to redress, the prevalence of violence against
women in Guinea. 1 1
Despite these encouraging signs, there are three on-going problems
with the women's rights legislation adopted in Guinea. First, both the civil
and criminal penal codes remain riddled with discriminatory and
unfavorable provisions. For instance, sexual exploitation is not expressly
mentioned in Guinean legislation102 Though discrimination is prohibited
in the Constitution, there is no definition of discrimination anywhere in
Guinean legislation. Consequently, the constitutional provision does not
adequately protect women in general, and refugee women in particular.
Second, enforcement of existing women's rights laws is minimal at
best. Underreporting of violence against women - whether refugee or
Guinean - is common. Marital rape in particular is rarely reported, as it is
widely considered the husband's right.' 03 Prostitution is rampant among
underage girls.' 04 The government has taken no action so far to halt the
prostitution of minor girls.105
Third, there are extreme obstacles to access to justice, particularly for
rural women who lack the education or resources to bring cases to court.
There is no legal aid system that can help women who lack the funds for a
lawyer. The Guinean government's incitement of sexual violence against
refugee women deters the judiciary from taking cases that might provide
redress. 10 6 Although Guinea's domestic legislation increasingly reflects an
awareness of women's rights, it nonetheless leaves protection of women in
general, and refugee women in particular, sorely lacking.
The disparity between women's rights laws and their enforcement has
particularly grave consequences for refugee women. These women face
additional barriers to justice: they are often unaware that they have the
right to access Guinean courts, and in addition, financial and linguistic
barriers often prevent them from doing so. The Guinean government, like
many host states, is unwilling to acknowledge that the camps are long-
term institutions,107 is hostile to the refugee influxes in general, 108 and takes
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 31-32 (discussing various forms of violence against women in Guinea; calling
for an increase in systematic data to "determine the levels, patterns and forms of violence
perpetrated against women").
102. ARC, Internal Report, supra note 64, at 26 ("Exploitation is not expressly mentioned
in the Guinean code."); see also CODE PANAL, art. 337 (GUINEA) (enumerating various other
forms of exploitation).
103. ARC, Internal Report, supra note 64, at 28.
104. Id, at 29.
105. Id.
106. See Refugee Women in Guinea Raped, supra note 28.
107. See Mark Pallis, The Operation of UNHCR's Accountability Mechanisms, I.I.L.J. Working
Paper 2005/12 (Global Administrative Series) 29 (2005).
108. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 74 (describing
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few steps to promote refugee women's rights. Thanks to the lack of
enforcement and difficulty accessing the justice system, Guinea's women's
rights laws provide virtually no practical protection for refugee women.
B. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
For more than a decade, refugee scholars have been advocating for
greater inclusion of women's rights in refugee protection.1' 9 There are
numerous advantages to using human rights law to highlight and reinforce
protection of refugee women. Most notably, human rights law can provide
a better legal basis on which to hold violators accountable. 1 0 Just as
incorporating human rights norms into Guinean domestic law has the
potential to benefit refugee women, incorporating these concepts into
refugee protection could improve refugee women's access to justice and
strengthen accountability mechanisms. In fact, over the last twenty years
there has been a gradual convergence of human rights law and refugee
law, both in UNHCR camps and in asylum jurisprudence in the West."'
However, as with Guinean domestic law, this development has produced
few tangible changes in refugee women's access to justice.
Structurally, refugee law has long been perceived as distinct from
human rights law." 2 Since its creation in the 1950s, refugee law has aimed
to protect those for" whom state protection has failed. 1 3 The function of
human rights law, on the other hand, is to alter the behavior of states."1
4
Thus, as refugee scholar Deborah Anker argues, human rights law has a
prospective function, whereas refugee law is remedial.1 5 The division
stems from in the text of the 1951 Convention itself, which gives substitute
state protection to those who have already been stripped of their rights."1
6
xenophobic attacks instigated by the Guinean government).
109. See, e.g., Chaloka Beyani, The Needs of Refugee Women: A Human Rights Perspective, 3(2)
GENDER AND DEv. 29 (1995); Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights
Paradigm, 15 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 133, 138 (2002); Emily Copeland, A Rare Opening in the Wall:
The Growing Recognition of Gender-Based Persecution, in PROBLEMS OF PROTECTION: THE
UNHCR, REFUGEES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 101,105 (Niklaus Steiner et. al. eds., 2003).
110. Brian Gorlick, Refugee Protection in Troubled Times: Reflections on Institutional and Legal
Developments at the Crossroads, in PROBLEMS OF PROTECTION: THE UNHCR, REFUGEES AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 79,94 (Niklaus Steiner et. al. eds., 2003).
111. Anker, supra note 109, at 133-36; see also Clark, supra note 76, at 586 ("The basis for a
wider rights-based protection for refugees is already laregely in place.")
112. ARTHUR HELTON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS:
PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND DISPLACED PERSONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN AND REFUGEE LAW, 2 (Briefing Paper issued
by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1991) [hereinafter HELTON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS
OF REFUGEES].
113. Anker, supra note 109, at 134-35.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 135.
116. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 98, art. 1(A)(2). The
Convention applies to someone who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
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Absent is the aspirational language featured in key human rights treaties
that address gender equality and access to justice. Refugee law was not
designed to alter the behavior of the sending state.
Refugee law can be further distinguished from human rights law
because it is grounded in state sovereignty rather than individual
equality." 7 Refugee law offers protection for those who have, for certain
specified reasons, lost the protection of their state. It is therefore
contingent on state behavior.11 8 By contrast, human rights law "is based on
the premise that certain rights are fundamental to all people" regardless of
state sovereignty." 9 The 1951 Convention obliges the host state to offer
surrogate protection to the refugee, based on the rights enumerated in the
Convention itself, not on a broader notion of the general applicability of
human rights norms. Refugee law places the great burden of responsibility
on the host state.
A growing movement among refugee scholars criticizes both these
distinctions. The first distinction - that refugee law is remedial, whereas
human rights law is aspirational - came under fire because it ignores
women's rights and women's protection needs.120 Women's rights activist
Chaloka Beyani argues that because refugee issues have largely been
separated from human rights, progressive interpretations of refugee
women's needs have been ignored both by women's rights advocates and
by refugee responders. 121 This first distinction is being eroded on other
grounds, too. Anker argues that the increasing cross-fertilization and
internationalization of asylum practices in different states has led to an
emerging pattern of the inclusion of human rights norms in asylum
decisions.122 This capitalizes on a long-standing practice by Western states
of using asylum law as a tool to identify human rights abuses of sending
countries.123
The second distinction - that refugee law is state-based, but human
rights law centers on the individual - has also been challenged. The
refugee response mechanisms established by the Convention dealt with
emergency situations like the post-World War II crisis, and as such, placed
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion is outside of the country of his nationality and is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country..." (emphasis added)..
117. HELTON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, supra note 112, at 2.
118. Id. ("Refugee and humanitarian law represent codification in treaty form of
international norms... that have grown out of a world order based on the doctrine of national
sovereignty.").
119. Id.
120. Beyani, supra note 109, at 30.
121. Id.
122. Anker, supra note 109, at 136-37.
123. See id. at 145 (discussing the 1996 U.S. decision, In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365
(U.S. BIA 1996) in which the United States Board of Immigration Appeals granted asylum to a
Togolese woman fleeing female genital surgery); see also LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY, supra
note 15, at 104 (arguing that grants of asylum in the United States during the Cold War were
significantly higher for individuals fleeing communist countries than other nations).
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a strong emphasis on the host state's responsibilities regarding non-
refoulement and assimilation. a24 But since the 1950s, the basic character of
refugee emergencies has changed.125 Large numbers of people linger in
long-term refugee camps while international actors search for elusive
durable solutions. 2 6 The host state remains the primary party responsible
for these refugees. 127 Even though UNHCR plays a crucial practical role in
responding to refugee influxes, it does not have a formal role under the
Convention.128 A state-based, rather than individual-based, notion of
refugee responsibility does not adequately respond to modern refugee
crises.
UNHCR's protection mandate has strong links to human rights, but
the contours of those links have changed over time. Under the UNHCR
Statute - a document written before the international covenants on human
rights were drafted - the High Commissioner's protection work is to be
entirely non-political and focused on humanitarian and social issues.129
Nonetheless, the Statute is implicitly linked to human rights of refugees,
because it exists in part to protect those who have a well-founded fear that
they will be the victims of future human rights abuses.130 In reality, the
early concept of UNHCR's protection obligations included preventing
refoulement, ensuring compliance with essential humanitarian standards,
and securing the enjoyment of basic human rights.'
31
The early notion of refugee protection, as seen in the 1951 Convention,
protected civil and political rights above economic and social ones by
124. HELTON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, supra note 112, at 6-7; see also Gorlick,
supra note 110, at 80 (relating the argument that the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol are
of limited relevance in dealing with refugee problems in less-developed countries).
125. LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY, supra note 15, at 75-76 (discussing how decolonization
brought about changes in "push" factors sending refugees over international borders).
126. Wilde, supra note 36, at 108-09 (arguing that many refugee camps in the developing
world have taken on a medium- or long-term character, constituting "settled and complex
communities of refugees... with marketplaces, schools, hospitals... and decision-making
fora.").
127. See Gorlick, supra note 110, at 80-81 (quoting the former Indian permanent
representative to the U.N., who argues that mass movements of refugees to developing
countries puts the fragile environment, economy, and society of those countries at risk).
128. GUY GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, 254 (2nd ed. 1998)
("Neither UNHCR nor any other international agency has any secure place of asylum and no
formal way to protect the personal security of refugees and asylum seekers, which in principle
remains largely the responsibility of governments.").
129. Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A.
Res. 428(V), ch. I, art. 2 (14 December 1950) (the Statute was issued on the same day that the
1951 Convention was opened for accession).
130. Erik Roxstr~m & Mark Gibney, The Legal and Ethical Obligations of UNHCR: The Case of
Temporary Protection in Western Europe, in PROBLEMS OF PROTECTION: THE UNHCR, REFUGEES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 39 (Niklaus Steiner et. al. eds., 2003); see also Gorlick, supra note 110,
at 87 (arguing that the 1951 Refugee Convention is a direct descendant of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights).
131. Arthur Helton, What is Refugee Protection? A Question Revisited, in PROBLEMS OF
PROTECTION: THE UNHCR, REFUGEES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 19, 19-33 (Niklaus Steiner et. al.
eds., 2003).
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focusing largely on political persecution.132 This primacy of (public) civil
and political rights above (private) economic and social rights directly
disadvantages women refugeesY3 3 The connection between economic
disadvantage and vulnerability to sexual exploitation in the camps
demonstrates the interconnected nature of women's protection needs. 134
And yet, for years, this connection was all but ignored. During the early
years of the Convention, women's claims for refugee status were viewed as
the 'derivative' claims of a spouse accompanying the 'real,' or male,
refugee.135
In the 1990s, UNHCR's protection role became increasingly pragmatic,
focusing on the delivery of food, shelter, and medicine.136 UNHCR has, to a
certain extent, become the humanitarian arm of the United Nations, a role
for which it has no mandate.137 In the 1990s, UNHCR took responsibility
for some additional human rights functions, for instance by monitoring
human rights violations in countries of origin in an attempt to identify and
stem refugee flows before they cross borders.13s And yet, despite this
expansion of human rights activities, Loescher characterizes the 1990s as a
period of decline in refugee protection, because "the central importance of
human rights protection of displaced and threatened populations [was]
frequently neglected." 139
Today, the basis for a wider, rights-based protection mandate is
already in place.140 However, when attempting to define how human rights
norms should be applied in emergency situations of mass influxes like the
situation in Guinea, the Convention is weakened by "ambiguities in key
terms."' 41 An authoritative interpretation of the Convention is needed to
give meaning to this nascent notion of rights-based refuge.142 Because
refugees do not forfeit their human rights based on their refugee status,
132. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 98, art. 1(A)(2) ; see Oloka-
Onyango, supra note 85, at 362 (arguing that the Convention's determination of refugee status
is rooted in the philosophy that awards primacy of place to political and civil rights above
economic and social rights).
133. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 85, at 362.
134. Id, at 384-85 (arguing that refugee women are involved in a wide variety of economic
and social activities largely within the private sphere that make them more susceptible to
sexual violence).
135. Copeland, supra note 109, at 102-03 (discussing the manner in which early refugee
status determinations considered the head of household only).
136. Loescher, UNHCR at Fifty, supra note 37, at 12-13; Oloka-Onyango, supra note 85, at
10-11 ("UNHCR... has seen its role progressively expand into a variety of different
humanitarian.., contexts").
137. Helton, What is Refugee Protection? A Question Revisited, supra note 131, at 25-27.
138. Loescher, UNHCR at Fifty, supra note 37, at 12.
139. Id. at 13.
140. Clark, supra note 76, at 568; see also Loescher, UNHCR at Fifty, supra note 37, at 15-16
(arguing that one way in which UNHCR and other refugee rights advocates should reverse
the decline in refugee protection is to insert human ights ideas into the current refugee
dialogue).
141. Clark, supra note 76, at 585-86.
142. Id. (arguing that the ICJ is the most appropriate court to give such a reading).
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UNHCR behavior should be at least consonant with human rights
values.1 43 Activists have begun to recognize that the lack of an integrated
human rights strategy exacerbates women's protection problems,'" and
have pushed for women's rights to be included in the redefinition of the
refugee agenda.
145
Refugee women's protection is one area in particular that has seen a
growth of the inclusion of human rights norms in recent years.
146 In 1985,
the protection of refugee women first appeared on the agenda of the
UNHCR Executive Committee. 147 Without using rights-based language, the
Executive Committee noted that refugee women are exposed to "special
problems," resulting from their "vulnerable situation," and called for a
more detailed investigation.148 In 1988, the Executive Committee
acknowledged that UNHCR could play a preventative role on this issue.
149
By 1989, the Committee specifically viewed sexual exploitation as a rights
violation,150 and in 1990 it requested that UNHCR draw up operational
guidelines for the protection of refugee women.'
5' The right in question
was further characterized as a fundamental human right - the right to
security of person - in 1993.152 By explicitly characterizing sexual
exploitation in this way, the Executive Committee placed women's human
rights firmly within UNHCR's general protection mandate.
Spurred by the Executive Committee, UNHCR issued a series of
guidelines incorporating human rights norms in the protection of refugee
women.153 The first policy on refugee women, issued in 1989, encouraged
143. Roxstrom & Gibney, supra note 130, at 39-40.
144. Beyani, supra note 109, at 30-31.
145. Copeland, supra note 109, at 103 (describing the manner in which various actors -
including UNHCR, NGOs, women's rights activists, and host countries - have slowly begun
to recognize refugee women's protection needs).
146. See id. at 101.
147. Conclusion on the International Protection of Refugees, U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees Executive Comm. Programme, "Refugee Women and International Protection",
Conclusion No. 39 (XXXVI), 1985; see generally Clark, supra note 76, at 600 (arguing that
Executive Committee conclusions have "considerable persuasive power" in their intended
contexts).
148. Id.
149. Conclusion on the International Protection of Refugees, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees Executive Comm. Programme, "Refugee Women," Conclusion No. 54 (XXXIX) 1988.
150. Conclusion on the International Protection of Refugees, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees Executive Comm. Programme, "Refugee Women," Conclusion No. 60 (XL), 1989.
151. Conclusion on the International Protection of Refugees, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees Executive Comm. Programme, "Refugee Women and International Protection,"
Conclusion No. 64 (XLI), 1990.
152. Conclusion on the International Protection of Refugees, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees Executive Comm. Programme, "Personal Security of Refugees", Conclusion No. 72
(XLIV), 1993; Executive Committee Conclusion No. 73 (XLIV), supra note 60.
153. Cf. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 85, at 11 (arguing that UNHCR's various policies on
refugee women are "situated firmly within the framework of international human rights
law").
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mainstreaming of women's protection issues.'5 In 1995, the Office issued a
more comprehensive policy, giving detailed programmatic guidance for a
multi-sector approach.5 5 The updated version of these guidelines, issued
in 2003 ("the Guidelines"), encourages refugee responders to engage
refugee women in designing and structuring aid programs, and is used by
some NGOs in the Forest Region of Guinea. 5 6 In 2000-2001, UNHCR
conducted an extensive dialogue with refugee women from around the
world, including refugee women in Guinea, which highlighted many of the
root causes behind sexual violence in camps. 5 7
Though the efforts of the Committee and the Office are welcome, they
only begin to address the needs of refugee women in Guinea. Before 2002,
there were some failures in protection. For instance, the Guidelines
recommend designing camp distribution programs so that women have
direct access to food and other supplies. 5 8 And yet in Guinea in 2002, men
dominated food distribution, and therefore men were the direct
beneficiaries159 There were also deficits in monitoring sexual exploitation;
though the Guidelines provide detailed, well-designed forms to track
violations, the women in the camps were deeply reluctant to report, and
UNHCR performed little outreach.160 During this period, the notion of
rights-based protection had little impact; refugees in Guinea were still very
much seen as "the recipients' of assistance, and not as decision-makers or
judges of it."161
Much to the disadvantage of refugee women throughout Africa,
UNHCR's failure to implement its policies has been widespread 62 A
Human Rights Watch report on Burundian refugees in Tanzania, for
instance, states that UNHCR guidelines have "often represented little more
than theory, with few, if any, efforts made by UNHCR staff to ensure that
154. UNHCR, Policy on Refugee Women,U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/754 (August 20, 1990) available
at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/excom/opendoc.pdf?tbl=EXCOM&id=
3b9cd20e5.
155. UNHCR, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST REFUGEES: GUIDELINES ON PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE, (1995) available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?
tbl=PUBL&id=3b9cc26c4.
156. UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 61 (used in ARC's legal aid
clinic).
157. UNHCR, REPORT ON THE DIALOGUE WITH REFUGEE WOMEN, supra note 72.
158. UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 61, at 45 ("Make sure that the
essential supplies - such as food, water, and fuel used for cooking - are given directly to
women or distributed by their intermediary.").
159. UNHCR, REPORT ON THE DIALOGUE WITH REFUGEE WOMEN, supra note 72, at 26
(citing a staffer in Guinea: "women felt they were left out of planning, designing,
implementing and even evaluating programs for refugee assistance... [leading to] poor access
to services like water, food distribution, and shelter").
160. See UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 61, Annex.
161. UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, A Beneficiary-Based Evaluation of
UNHCR's Programme in Guinea, West Afica, 128, EPAU/2001/02 (Jan. 2001) (prepared by
Tania Kaiser).
162. See, e.g., UNHCR, AGENDA FOR PROTECTION (3d ed. 2003) 86 (emphasizing the need to
disseminate and monitor implementation of 2003 Guidelines worldwide).
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they form a routine and integral part of all UNHCR programs .
,163
Similar concerns have been raised regarding Sudanese refugees in Chad,
where women have been raped when leaving camps to collect firewood,
even though the 2003 Guidelines emphasize finding safe ways to provide
necessary cooking equipment.64 There are, of course, severe funding
shortfalls which make implementing the Guidelines harder.
165 Nonetheless,
there remains a prominent notion that UNHCR, as the UN's humanitarian
agency, may have to choose between human rights and practical
realities.
166
Accountability remains one of the key areas of the prevention strategy
articulated in the 2003 Guidelines that has not been fully embraced in
Guinea.167 Apart from a legal aid clinic run by the American Refugee
Conmmittee, there is no formal mechanism for asserting complaints.
UNHCR has yet to establish a general oversight mechanism to provide
accountability for the behavior of its staff and volunteers in the field in
Guinea or elsewhere in the region.
6s The refugee-run Camp Committees
frequently try to assert authority over sexual violence cases that belong in
the Guinean criminal justice system.
169
UNHCR is well-placed to address issues of sexual violence in the
camps' 70 and has made a good start through the Executive Committee
action and the Guidelines. But without greater policy implementation and,
more importantly, an impartial system of accountability that can address
violations by staff members and others, attempts to protect refugee women
from sexual violence fall short.1n Much like the incorporation of human
163. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SEEKING PROTECTION, supra note 1, Section I.
164. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES AMONG
DISPLACED PERSONS IN DARFUR AND CHAD, supra note 1 (referring to the 2003 UNHCR
guidelines to argue that more should be done by the Office).
165. See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, FUNDING CRISIS IN REFUGEE ASSISTANCE: IMPACT ON
REFUGEES (Nov. 20, 2002).
166. See, e.g., Beth Elise Whitaker, Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: The Rwandan
Repatriation from Tanzania, in PROBLEMS OF PROTECTION: THE UNHCR, REFUGEES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 141, 146-151 (Niklaus Steiner, et al. eds., 2003) (describing the political and financial
realities faced by UNHCR when Tanzania decided to forcibly repatriate Rwandan refugees in
1996-1997); Roxstrbm & Gibney, supra note 130, at 42 (arguing that UNHCR will always need
to "strike an appropriate balance between principles and pragmatism").
167. UNHCR GUIDELINES ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 61, at 67-69; see Kaiser, supra
note 161, 127-128.
168. Peter Dennis, Op-Ed., The U.N., Preying on the Weak, WASH. POST, APR. 12, 2005, at A-
21 (discussing lack of accountability in the context of UNHCR's actions in Sierra Leone).
169. Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SEEKING PROTECTION, supra note 1, at Section VIII
(discussing the failure of the refugee-run informal justice system to provide Burundian
refugee women with accountability).
170. WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, YOU CANNOT DANCE IF
YOU CANNOT STAND: A REVIEW OF THE RWANDA WOMEN'S INITIATIVE AND THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES' COMMITMENT TO GENDER EQUALITY IN POST-
CONFLICT SOCIETIES 28-30 (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/
rwi-ss.pdf.
171. See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 85, at 369-70 (arguing that general enforcement of the
Guidelines is a major problem, particularly in the African context).
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rights in Guinean law, inclusion of human rights in UNHCR practice is
paralleled by missed opportunities for greater protection.
C. The Humanitarian NGOs
In the aftermath of the 2001-2002 sexual exploitation scandals and the
ensuing UNHCR and OIOS reports, humanitarian organizations working
in the camps in Guinea began to promulgate codes of conduct that were
more responsive to human rights in general, and women's rights in
particular. 172 This shift mirrored a broader movement among humanitarian
organizations operating in Africa and elsewhere for greater incorporation
of human rights norms in humanitarian action.173 One of the largest efforts
along these lines is the SPHERE Project, an attempt to codify rights-based
humanitarianism.174
Before the movement for rights-based humanitarianism became
prominent, some scholars argued that many NGOs were more concerned
with philanthropy than rights.175 Policy analyst David Rieff even goes so
far as to argue that this philanthropy was underscored by neutrality, a
sense that human rights promotion and humanitarian action were "distinct
and in some ways irreconcilable imperatives." 176 Yet after the failures of
humanitarian organizations aiding Rwandan refugees in 1994-1995,
scholars and practitioners publicly questioned the role of neutrality in
humanitarianism, arguing that it can result in diminished protection, of
human rights. 77 Activist and scholar Alex de Waal argues that by
prioritizing neutrality in Rwanda, for example, humanitarian agencies
172. See, e.g., AMERICAN REFUGEE COMMITEE, SEXUAL MISCONDUCT POLICY, supra note 81
("The American Refugee Committee believes strongly in the human dignity of each
individual.").
173. See, e.g., Hugo Slim, Not Philanthropy But Rights: Rights-Based Humanitarianism and the
Proper Politicisation of Humanitarian Philosophy in War, Centre for Development and Emergency
Practice, Oxford Brookes University, 21 (2003), available at http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/
confpapers/slim new.pdf ("Grounding humanitarian action in rights, duties and laws makes
the values of humanitarian work explicit to all and it links humanitarian values directly to
justice.").
174. See Barbara Harrell-Bond, Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees be Humane? 24 HuM.
RTS. Q. 51, 75 (2002) (citing the SPHERE Project as one way in which the abuse of power by
humanitarian organizations vis-i-vis their beneficiaries 'can be broken down through
increased accountability); Slim, supra note 173, at 18 (discussing SPHERE in addition to
ICRC's Avenir process, in which ICRC committed to developing a rights-based framework for
humanitarianism).
175. Slim, supra note 173, at 10.
176. David Rieff, Humanitarianism in Crisis, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 111, 112 (2002).
177. ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES: POLITICS AND THE DISASTER RELIEF INDUSTRY IN
AFRICA 191-202 (1997) (arguing that the Rawandese Patriotic Front (RPF) advance and
eventual capture of power meant that many of the refugees who fled to Zaire and given
humanitarian aid were former gdnocidaires); Whitaker, supra note 166, at 150 (discussing the
forced repatriation from Tanzania of Rwandan refugees in 1996-1997 which was not actively
protested by the humanitarian organizations working in Tanzania at the time).
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actually contributed to the worsening of the human rights abuses by
protecting the perpetrators of the genocide and giving them an
opportunity to regroup and rearm.
178 Rwanda is a stark example that
naturally raises questions about the responsibilities and duties of
peacekeeping forces and state governments; but nonetheless, it illustrates a
shift in the field. Neutrality was relevant to humanitarian emergencies
caused by state-to-state wars, but protecting refugees through neutrality is
considerably harder in situations involving non-state actors or quasi-state
armed groups.179
The increasing politicization of NGO operations underscores the
growing irrelevance of philanthropy as a guiding principle for
humanitarian aid. Today, NGOs rely on government funding far more
now than they did a few decades ago.
80 Therefore, aid has begun to mimic
the political objectives of the donor governments.
18' In this context, the
guiding principles of neutrality and philanthropy no longer make so much
sense; some feel that NGOs need to shift their focus in order to become
"effective and morally coherent." 82
The shift away from neutrality and philanthropy was accompanied by
a deep sense of unease with the debasing relationship between aid giver
and recipient. 8 3 For anthropologist and refugee activist Barbara Harrell-
Bond, the very idea of charity is debasing, placing the power for
determining survival exclusively in the hands of the humanitarian aid
workers.84 The SPHERE Project's organizing document, the Humanitarian
Charter, puts human rights center stage by focusing on the fundamental
rights of the beneficiary, and by asserting that the right to life with dignity
is one of the principles of "fundamental importance" to
humanitarianism.18 5 This shift to rights-based humanitarianism aims to
make the beneficiaries "more than passive recipients of the charity of
others."186 Rights-based humanitarianism goes beyond "private charity or
governmental largess" by defending and securing the beneficiaries' human
rights.187
178. DE WAAL, supra note 177, at 191-98.
179. Elizabeth G. Ferris, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the International
Refugee Regime, in PROBLEMS OF PROTECTION: THE UNHCR, REFUGEES AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 117-
37,125 (Niklaus Steiner et al. eds., 2003).
180. Id. at 125.
181. Id.
182. Rieff, supra note 176, at 113.
183. Harrell-Bond, supra note 174, at 54-55.
184. Id.; see also Nicolette Lawrie & Wim Van Damme, The Importance of Refugee-Host
Relations: Guinea 1990-2003, 362 THE LANCET 575 (2003) (arguing that labeling large-scale
influxes of refugees as a "burden" in need of charity boosts donor support but undermines
host-refugee relations).
185. THE SPHERE PROJECT, HUMANITARIAN CHARTER AND MINIMUM STANDARDS 
IN
DISASTER RESPONSE 17 (2004). The other two fundamental principles are the distinction
between combatants and non-combatants and the principle of non-refoulement. Id.
186. Rieff, supra note 176, at 114.
187. Harrell-Bond, supra note 174, at 52.
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The disproportionate vulnerability of refugee women makes them
prime examples of the phrase "passive recipients of charity." Harrell-Bond
suggests that recognizing the fundamental dignity of aid recipients may
help shift the camps' destructive power balance in favor of refugees.
Vesting refugee women with the power to lodge complaints or to
otherwise hold camp officials accountable, for example, may also further
shift that balance of power.188 The Charter does not specifically address
women's rights, though there are some technical guidelines in the second
part of the SPHERE Handbook on the best ways to implement aid
programs to protect women's rights. 89 The Charter does emphasize,
however, that NGOs' "fundamental accountability must be to those we
seek to assist,"' 90 which suggests a high degree of responsiveness to the
needs of the women they aid.
In practice, the incorporation of human rights norms into
humanitarianism has had limited impact on refugee women's rights. This
may be in part because initiatives such as the SPHERE Project are still
embryonic efforts191 Awareness of rights-based humanitarianism has taken
root more strongly in head offices than in field offices, leading to a
temporary disconnect between the values promulgated by some
organizations and the realities in the field.192 A further obstacle to
implementation is that there remains some debate within the humanitarian
community as to the appropriate place of human rights within
humanitarianism.193
In Guinea, the American Refugee Committee's Legal Aid Clinic for
Women is one successful example of rights-based humanitarianism in
action. 194 ARC operates two clinics for refugee women, both staffed by
Guinean lawyers.195 The clinics are able to capitalize on Guinea's favorable
women's human rights laws to take on sexual assault, rape, and sexual
exploitation cases in addition to child custody and alimony mediations.196
188. See id. at 70.
189. THE SPHERE PROJECT, supra note 185.
190. Id. at 19.
191. MARCI VAN DYKE & RONALD WALDMAN, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY MAILMAN SCHOOL OF
PUBLIC HEALTH, THE SPHERE PROJECT: EVALUATION REPORT, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
MAILMAN SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 31 (2004) ("The bold effort to introduce a 'rights-based'
approach to humanitarianism, while welcomed by many NGOs is, after all, only a few years
old.").
192. Id. at 6.
193. See Rieff, supra note 176, at 118-19 (2002) (arguing that humanitarians have not
completely adapted to the "uncontested centrality" of human rights); Harrell-Bond, supra note
174, at 76 (noting that the organizational cultures of some humanitarian organizations,
including UNHCR, can create barriers to such fundamental shifts in organizational goals).
194. ARC INT'L, OVERVIEW OF THE FERN HOLLAND LEGAL AID CLINIC, supra note 73, at 9.
195. Id.; See also ARC INT'L, GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE: A PARTICIPATORY TOOLKIT, supra
note 58, at 8 ("ARC's two clinics process between 400 to 600 cases per year, working only with
refugees.").
196. Elizabeth Rubin, Fern Holland's War, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 19, 2004, at 68-69 (stating
that Holland proposed opening the legal aid clinic partly because she found that Guinea's
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For instance, if the clinics take on a rape case, the clinic's Guinean lawyers
help the woman prosecute her case in Guinean court by providing her with
legal support during the investigatory and trial phase of the prosecution.
The clinics also work with clients who wish to mediate their cases using
informal procedures set up at the camp. Mediation is usually reserved for
child custody and alimony situations. The clinics operate as semi-
independent entities, using separate staff and buildings from ARC's
regular operations. The clinics protect women's rights on several levels:
first, by providing access to justice to redress violations of their physical
security; second, by securing alimony payments that address the women's
economic needs and reduce their vulnerability to rights violations; and
third, by raising awareness of women's rights among men and women in
the refugee and humanitarian aid communities.
However, rights-based humanitarianism, including the clinic model, is
not without on-going structural problems. First, some scholars question
how far the language of rights can be taken, especially in emergency
situations.197 This is particularly relevant for some women's rights
traditionally within the private sphere, which can be quickly neglected in
emergency situations or contested on cultural relativist grounds.
198 Second,
donor governments seem to be far more interested in a needs-based
approach to humanitarianism than a rights-based one, partly because the
needs-based approach is easier to defend before their own public, and
partly because they may not wish to accrue the duty-bearing responsibility
that is implied by the rights-based approach.
199
The ultimate structural problem with rights-based humanitarianism is
lack of accountability. Are NGOs willing to work under a system that
holds them accountable to their rights-bearing beneficiaries - and if so,
what would that accountability look like? The SPHERE Project's
Humanitarian Charter does include some provisions on accountability, but it
does not specify exactly how such a system would work.
200 A clinic-based
accountability model, such as that used by ARC, has certain intrinsic
problems, including its organizational links to the NGO community itself,
domestic law and international obligations provided the necessary legal basis to pursue
successful claims).
197. Rieff, supra note 176, at 118 (arguing that "the language of rights is much more
problematic than relief NGOs have thus far been willing to recognize," citing the right to food
as one particular example of a contested right that could be hard to deliver in a place
"convulsed by ethnic war").
198. See Bonny lbawoh, Defining Persecution and Protection: The Cultural Relativism Debate
and the Rights of Refugees, in PROBLEMS OF PROTECTION: THE UNHCR, REFUGEES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 61,67-68 (Niklaus Steiner et al., eds., 2003).
199. VAN DYKE & WALDMAN, supra note 193, at 32 (quoting a staffer for a donor
government who posed the question, "Can you imagine someone suing the US State
Department for human rights violations for not giving them adequate shelter?").
200. THE SPHERE PROJECT, supra note 185, at 19 ("We expect to be held accountable to this
commitment and undertake to develop systems for accountability within our respective
agencies, consortia and federations.").
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its Western-based funding sources, and its reliance on a receptive court
system in the host country. Unlike UNHCR, NGOs are not necessarily
trained to fulfill protection roles,201 and so they should not be the sole aid
providers held responsible for providing accountability mechanisms.
Lack of accountability deeply affects refugee women who have been
victims of sexual violence. Gender-based violence researcher Jeanne Ward
emphasizes that a rights-based approach in women's rights programming
requires both that gender-based violence be explicitly addressed when
planning humanitarian assistance strategies and that any efforts to confront
gender-based violence must be "inclusive of the population served and the
needs of the most vulnerable."202 These standards constitute the bare
minimum. Movements in the NGO community to provide accountability
and access to justice for refugee women are most welcome and must be
encouraged.
The trio of aid providers in Guinea - the government, NGOs, and
UNHCR - all fail to guard the human rights of women refugees in similar
ways: lack of enforcement of laws or policies designed to protect women,
limited access to justice, and ineffective accountability mechanisms.
Though each aid provider has taken steps to incorporate human rights
norms, each has failed to redress the violations of refugee women's
fundamental human rights. If aid providers wish to emphasize that
individual beneficiaries are endowed with inalienable rights, then the aid
providers have specific responsibilities to help the individuals realize those
rights.20 3 There is a clear need for more comprehensive protection of the
physical security of refugee women.204
III. STATES, STATE-LIKE ACTORS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
There is no effective state-like actor providing refugee women in
Guinea's camps with accountability or access to justice. Acknowledging
the human rights of beneficiaries naturally correlates with affording each
individual the ability to assert those rights.205 Refugee women do not have
the democratic means to change those in positions of authority - they
cannot vote out UNHCR - and so it is all the more important to establish a
quasi-judicial or judicial system that can provide greater accountability.2 06
201. Ferris, supra note 179, at 129.
202. Jeanne Ward, THE REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH FOR REFUGEES CONSORTIUM, IF NOT Now,
WHEN? ADDRESSING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN REFUGEE, INTERNALLY DISPLACED, AND POST-
CONFLICT SETTINGS: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW, 9 (2002).
203. See, e.g., Oloka-Onyango, supra note 85, at 19 (arguing that refugee women would be
well-served by an expeditious and effective inspection and accountability mechanism).
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Rieff, supra note 176, at 113 (citing an Action Contre la Faim worker, "What I
support is the victims' access to their rights - that is, a construction that makes them subjects,
not objects").
206. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 85, at 18-19 (arguing that the best protectors of rights are
the people themselves, and that women must have a mode of redress).
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Collectively, the trio of aid providers amounts to the defacto state in the
refugee camps. The long-term camps in Guinea's Forest Region are active
polities; the camps have more sophisticated municipal infrastructures than
many of the neighboring villages and towns.20 7 Each member of the trio of
aid providers - the government, NGOs, and UNHCR - performs vital
state-like functions. And yet no member of the trio functions fully as a
state. None of them take on full duty-bearing responsibilities to ensure the
human rights of the residents. Without effective state-like institutions -
institutions that are accountable and offer residents the means through
which to realize their rights - the movement for greater recognition of the
human rights of refugees becomes empty.
Enforcement, access to justice, and accountability are key functions of
an effective state.208 Enforcement of the policies promulgated by the
government and the provision of basic physical security are two core state
functions. As part of their responsibility to provide law and order, states -
like aid providers - have a duty not to violate certain human rights norms.
They may also have a duty to prevent private actors from violating those
norms. Another key state function, often derived from international
treaties to which the state is party, is the obligation to aid in the realization
of certain human rights.209 Strong state functions can make the
fundamental dignity of each individual refugee a central part of the aid
response. 2
10
What exactly would strong state-like institutions that provide the
crucial functions of enforcement, access to justice, and accountability look
like? Francis Fukuyama uses two criteria to assess the strength of a state or
state-like institution.21' He argues that it is necessary to measure both the
scope of the state's functions and the strength of the state's institutional
capacities. 212 In assessing the breadth of state role, Fukuyama suggests that
ensuring the rule of law and providing essential public goods like courts
are functions with a fairly basic scope, while more activist state functions
include wealth redistribution and social insurance.
2 3 In assessing the
state's institutional capacities, Fukuyama identifies the transparency with
which the institution operates as an important measure of its strength.
214
Ultimately, for Fukuyama, " [tihe essence of stateness is... enforcement," or
in other words, the ability to ensure compliance with the state's laws and
207. Cf Wilde, supra note 36, at 109.
208. FRANCiS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21
sr
CENTURY 8-10 (2004) (discussing various types of state functions).
209. See, e.g., International Convention on Civil and Political Rights arts. 2, 40, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S, 17 [hereinafter ICCPR].
210. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 85, at 19 (discussing who will monitor the aid workers
in order to prevent abuses).
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policies.215
Fukuyama argues that weak governments - as evaluated using this
two-part framework - can be the source of humanitarian and human rights
disasters.2 6 For example, Sierra Leone's government has a very limited
scope of state functions, barely meeting minimal functions such as rule of
law and property rights.217 Sierra Leone also has very weak institutions,
and to Fukuyama, this is a fatal combination. 218 On the other hand, Turkey
takes on an ambitious range of state functions, but its institutions,
including the courts, are still relatively weak.219 Although Turkey attempts
to provide a broad pallet of public goods to its citizens, it does so without a
strong enough system of accountability to ensure fundamental rights. A
similar analysis holds true for Guinea's refugee camps: an ambitious scope
bf state functions implemented weakly can result in the failure to ensure
human rights.
A. The Guinean Government's Weak State Functioning in the Camps
According to its international obligations, the Guinean government
must act as a surrogate state to the refugees in its territory. 220 Fundamental
human rights standards apply without discrimination between national
and alien221 and in some situations can offer a greater level of protection
than that established by the 1951 Refugee Convention.222 For instance, the
rights declared in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
including access to courts and protection of physical security, must be
ensured to "all individuals within the territory and subject to its
jurisdiction."223 States party to the ICCPR must broadly apply the
fundamental right to recognition as a person before the law.224
In addition to the obligations imposed by the ICCPR, the Guinean
government also accrues specific obligations through the 1951 Refugee
Convention. The preamble affirms "the principle that human beings shall
enjoy fundamental human rights and freedoms without distinction."225 The
Convention distinguishes between rights that must be accorded a
minimum standard of realization - at least that which is accorded to aliens
215. Id. at 6.
216. Id. at x.
217. Id. at 13 fig. 5.
218. Id. at 13.
219. Id. at 12.
220. Anker, supra note 109, at 134-35.
221. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 128, at 231.
222. Clark, supra note 76, at 591 (arguing that articulations of non-refoulement in the
Convention Against Torture and other human rights treaties provide broader protection than
article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention).
223. ICCPR, supra note 209, art. 2(1).
224. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 128, at 232 (arguing that refugees have a fundamental
right to be recognized as persons before the law).
225. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 98, preamble, 1.
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generally - and rights that must be realized without distinction between
national and refugee.22 6 Access to courts is in the latter category; all
refugees in Guinea are entitled to the same assistance in accessing courts as
nationals.
227
The government has ceded large portions of its day-to-day operations
in the camps to UNHCR through memoranda of understanding. Because
Guinea has negotiated agreements with UNHCR, it can be assumed to
have admitted the refugees lawfully and is obligated to implement the
Convention. 2 The delegation of day-to-day operations to UNHCR does
not include delegation of legal responsibility; new memoranda are drawn
up for each country UNHCR works with, and terms of the memoranda can
be renegotiated at any point.229 For instance, the 2001 Memorandum of
Understanding between ECOWAS and UNHCR specifically aims to
address "the needs of vulnerable groups such as women and children in
West African countries," and aims to stabilize countries in the region.
230
The agreement does not, however, impose any additional legal obligations
on UNHCR beyond those to which the organization is bound through its
statute or as' a part of the U.N. Through its memoranda of understanding
the Guinean government cedes de facto control of some camp functions, but
does not relinquish the legal obligation to protect refugees.
In practice, the government remains responsible for the security of the
camps and is represented primarily by two organizations: the Bureau
National de Coordination de R6fugi6s (BNCR) and the Brigade Mixte de
S6curitC (BMS). BNCR operates as a coordinating agency between the
Guinean government and other actors in the field, while BMS is a joint
military and police bureau that provides security for the camps. In
addition to providing security, the Guinean government provides land for
the camps themselves, but attempts to limit refugees' ability to cultivate
that land. The Guinean government agencies responsible for refugees are
not particularly powerful or well-coordinated.
Viewing the Guinean government's exercise of state-like functions over
the refugee camps through Fukuyama's analytical framework, it becomes
clear that the government is relatively weak.231 The Guinean government
provides a very limited range of services - general security and land - and
does not attempt to secure basic individual rights, including physical
226. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 128, at 298-99.
227. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 98, art. 16 (access to courts
must include free legal assistance and exemption from cautio judicatum solvi, if those
provisions are offered to nationals).
228. Clark, supra note 76, at 597-98.
229. See, e.g., Basic Agreement (Government of the Republic of South Africa and UNHCR),
Sept. 61, 1993 available at http://www.lhr.org.za/refugee/policy/policy02basic.htm
(expanding UNHCR's capacities in South Africa beyond that of the 1991 memorandum of
understanding).
230. UNHCR, ECOWAS-UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 77.
231. See generally FUKUYAMA, supra note 208, at 16-17 (describing how many sub-Saharan
African states decreased both state scope and state strength during the 1980s and 1990s).
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security and property rights. The government's provision of public goods
to the Forest Region in general is also minimal.232 The state institutions that
oversee the camps are strong in some respects - the BMS and the BCR
exercise territorial control over the camps, and so are able to carry out the
government's security policies - but offer no accountability and are subject
to high levels of corruption. 233 In addition, the leaders of the BMS and the
BCR defer to police and security forces and are often not informed of new
refugee arrivals or detentions.23 4
B. UNHCR's Assumption of a Quasi-State Role in the Camps
When UNHCR assumes responsibility for providing basic public
services, such as nutrition, education, and health, in long-term refugee
camps the agency becomes, in some respects, a quasi-state. In Guinea and
elsewhere, UNHCR has taken on functions that "were not predictable -
either in terms of character or permanency - at the time the office was
created." 235 In long-term camps, which develop sophisticated and complex
community structures, UNHCR goes far beyond providing basic
emergency care.236 In Guinea the agency operates much like a local
government, exercising a greater degree of control over the municipal
operations in the camps than the host government itself.237
UNHCR has signed memoranda of understanding with the host
government that allow it to take on certain state-like functions in running
the camps. The transfer of power from the government to UNHCR
supports the state-like character of UNHCR's operations. In particular, the
2001 Memorandum of Understanding between ECOWAS and UNHCR
was aimed at addressing "the needs of vulnerable groups such as women
and children." 238 Though UNHCR does not accrue additional legal
obligations through these memoranda of understanding, it does take on
232. Guinea; Further Economic Decline Expected as Donors Quit, U. N. INTEGRATED REGIONAL
INFORMATION NETWORK, June 29, 2004, http://www.irinnews.orgprint.asp?ReportD=41918.
("In the remote Forest Region, in southern Guinea, the last public investment in hydraulic and
electric services or highway infrastructures was in 1961. Since then, the population of the
region has increased by five.").
233. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 208, at 8-9 ("Strength in this sense includes.., the ability
to formulate and carry out policies and enact laws; ... to control graft, corruption, and
bribery; to maintain a high level of transparency and accountability in government
institutions .. "); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LIBERIAN REFUGEES IN GUINEA, supra note
11 (describing the government's exercise of state control with respect to refugees, including
border closing, extended detention, and incitement to rape).
234. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 60 (stating that the control and
management of refugees in Guinea is viewed as a matter of national security, describing the
manner in which police and security forces controlled information about refugee arrivals and
detentions, and noting that the President made all final decisions on refugee matters).
235. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 85, at 11.
236. See Wilde, supra note 36, at 108.
237. Compare id. at 110 (discussing the Dadaab camps in Kenya).
238. UNHCR, ECOWAS-UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 77.
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specifically-delegated state functions. 239
In practice, UNHCR functions as the municipal government of the
camps by overseeing camp committees, providing basic legal services,
including status determination, and running marketplaces. By taking
primary responsibility for refugee status determination, UNHCR plays a
major role in choosing the "citizens" of this state-like entity. UNHCR
maintains the dirt roads that lead from nearby towns to the camps, and it
coordinates with the World Food Programme to transport necessary
supplies from the east of the country. In addition, UNHCR oversees NGO
"partners" who implement various aspects of the refugee response
strategy, including health, education, and job-training services. NGOs
must win approval, and in some cases funding, from UNHCR in order to
perform these services. In both its supervisory and direct-service provision
roles, UNHCR takes on many functions normally attributed to a
government.
According to international lawyer Ralph Wilde, UNHCR's state-like
character gives it certain responsibilities under international human rights
law.240 First, Wilde establishes that UNHCR has international personality,
which incurs responsibility under international law.2 41 Second, he argues
that the scope of that responsibility is determined by the circumstances in
which the organization exercises its legal personality - namely the state-
like behavior.242 And so, in Wilde's eyes, UNHCR's de facto sovereignty
implies direct responsibility for upholding human rights treaty obligations
entered into by the host state.
243
Wilde's reading of UNHCR's human rights obligations is certainly not
the mainstream interpretation, but other scholars agree that UNHCR has at
least some limited responsibility to enforce human rights norms. For
instance, Goodwin-Gill agrees that UNHCR, as a subsidiary organ of the
General Assembly, has international personality and therefore can possess
international rights and duties.2 " Van Dyke and Waldman take the
position that once an international organization chooses to intervene in a
humanitarian situation, it becomes obligated to help beneficiaries exercise
their legal rights.245 And from a policy standpoint, Harrell-Bond argues
that once UNHCR starts operating in a country, a perspective can emerge
that the organization is responsible for refugees in all respects.
2 46 This
perspective is compounded by the notion that UNHCR staffers are 'senior'
239. Compare Basic Agreement, supra note 229, § 11 (stating that refugees shall "enjoy full
legal protection," but not specifying that UNHCR has additional responsibilities for legal
protection).
240. Wilde, supra note 36, at 115.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.; see also Harrell-Bond, supra note 174, at 75-76 (discussing Wilde's argument, and
disagreeing with it on other grounds).
244. GuY GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 128, at 216.
245. VAN DYKE & WALDMAN, supra note 191, at 30-31.
246. Harrell-Bond, supra note 174, at 78.
34
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 9 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol9/iss1/2
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
to host government officials. 247
UNHCR certainly has a duty not to violate human rights norms while
operating in Guinea; staff members and volunteers, for example, must not
commit acts of sexual violence. Furthermore, as a state-like entity with
considerable policy-setting capabilities, UNHCR also has a limited duty to
prevent others from committing human rights violations. UNHCR has no
criminal law function that would allow it to prosecute individual suspects,
but it must enforce existing policies designed to reduce systemic
occurrences of sexual violence.
There are considerable limits to UNHCR's duty to prevent human
rights violations. First, the agency is often limited by the security situation.
For instance, in 2000-2001, UNHCR had trouble preventing Kamajor
recruitment in the camps because violence in the region left UNHCR with
no access to the camps. 248 Second, the agency is further limited by its
double mandate: it must simultaneously "protect refugees from
repression" and "facilitate state policies towards refugees." 249 This ties
UNHCR's hands with respect to the government and undermines its
ability to prevent sexual violence perpetrated by government agents. 25° So
UNHCR's duty to prevent is a generalized duty that can focus primarily on
policies aimed at ending systemic violations of women's rights, rather than
on individual instances of sexual violence.
Applying Fukuyama's two-part framework, UNHCR's state-like
functioning in the camps is strong. Although the agency provides few civil
or political rights, UNHCR does perform a broad range of state-like
functions, from providing public goods to coordinating private activity and
fostering markets.251 The institutions that implement these state-like
functions are relatively strong; UNHCR exercises a virtual monopoly on
enforcement of policies within the camps. Because refugees are reliant on
UNHCR for basic necessities, Harrell-Bond argues that some will pander to
the organization, representing themselves as "good" refugees who are
helpless victims of circumstances. 252 This further bolsters the relative
strength of UNHCR's institutions by makng enforcement easier. UNHCR
has the state-like capacity to implement policies that protect women's
rights. UNHCR is, in some ways, a stronger "state" than the Guinean
government.
247. Id. at 56.
248. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YOUTH, POVERTY, AND BLOOD: THE LETHAL LEGACY OF
WEST AFRICA'S REGIONAL WARRIORS, supra note 9, at Section IV.
249. See Loescher, UNHCR at Fifty, supra note 37, at 4-5.
250. Id.
251. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 208, at 7-8 (discussing the World Bank's framework for
measuring state functions).
252. See Harrell-Bond, supra note 174, at 58.
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C. NGOs' Limited State-Like Qualities
The NGOs that operate in the Forest Region are like a series of
administrative agencies, in that UNHCR selects the partner agencies, who
each then take on specific state-like roles. UNHCR retains a monitoring
and evaluating role for all projects implemented in the camps.
253 In
addition, UNHCR acts as the coordinating body, overseeing access to the
camps and providing funding to NGOs. Individual NGOs often take on
one or two specific state functions, similar to an administrative agency.
Together, their operations constitute a massive and complex operation.
De Waal labels the groups of specialists, consultants, and lobbyists that
pull together these operations the "Humanitarian International," arguing
that they function as an internationalized social welfare agency.
254 NGOs
bring to Guinea logistical resources that permit them to function, including
generators, jeeps, and extensive radio communications systems. They rely
on both international and national staff members, many of whom have
gained experience in other refugee settings. They also provide access to
international media. According to de Waal, however, the press does not
always provide an adequate accountability check on the scope and
character of the NGOs' collective operation.
255
Van Dyke and Waldman outline the chain of responsibility that falls to
NGO operations of this scale. 25 6 NGOs have a basic duty not to violate
human rights while going about their operations, but they do not have a
formal, state-like duty to prevent human rights violations. 257 Once NGOs
make the choice to intervene, however, they become "obligated to help
those they are assisting to exercise their legal rights . . . ."2 In refugee
settings where rights holders lack the capacity to exercise political will,
rights-based programming, such as that advocated by the SPHERE Project,
forms part of the basis for an accountable system.25 9 Where the host state
lacks the capacity to protect refugees' fundamental human rights, it falls to
UNHCR and NGOs to craft systems of accountability and access to justice.
Under Fukuyama's two-part framework, NGOs have a limited state-
like quality. Together, they perform a number of state-like operations,
providing services analogous to complex state functions.26° Measuring their
253. See Pallis, supra note 107, at 13.
254. DE WAAL, supra note 177, at 65-66 (arguing that the "Humanitarian International" has
converged around a common culture that prevents them from being fully accountable).
255. See id. at 84-85 (arguing that the international media cannot provide the needed level
of accountability because too many journalists work closely with the "Humanitarian
International," thus losing their impartiality).
256. VAN DYKE & WALDMAN, supra note 191, at 30- 31.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 31.
259. See, e.g., Lola Gostelow, The Sphere Project: The Implication of Making Humanitarian
Principles and Codes Work, 23(4) DISASTERS 316, 321 (1999) (discussing rights-based
programming as being "appropriate in those very contexts where rights have eroded").
260. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 208, at 7-11.
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institutional strength is more difficult, as NGOs are under the logistical
and in some cases financial oversight of UNHCR. In addition, the measure
of institutional capacity may vary strongly by function.261 NGOs are good
at delivering economic and social services. But NGOs and their oversight
body, UNHCR, are poor at maintaining "a high level of transparency and
accountability," which is a key component of strong institutions. 262 While
NGOs behave like states to the extent that they perform crucial state-like
functions under a powerful organizational and operational structure, they
do not provide the political or judicial accountability crucial to full
recognition of their beneficiaries as bearers of fundamental human rights.
D. No Effective State, and No Incentive to Collaborate
There is no effective state in Guinea's refugee camps. The trio of aid
providers cobbles together a broad range of state-like functions to operate
the camps. They perform some of these functions well: the camps are
operational municipalities with active schools, markets, and religious
institutions. But none of the three actors provides political or judicial
accountability that safeguard against violations of human rights. It is not
enough for the trio of aid providers to pledge to address the underlying
causes of sexual violence in refugee camps. Instead, given the fundamental
rights-bearing nature of the refugee, the trio of aid providers that offer
governance to those refugees must also provide mechanisms to ensure the
refugees' rights are realized. A state that recognizes the fundamental
human rights of its citizens must provide accountability to ensure the
exercise of those rights. In the camps, no such accountability exists.
The host state has the ultimate legal responsibility under the 1951
Convention.263 In reality, Guinea is a weak state, hostile to the massive
influxes of refugees. Not only is Guinea unable to provide real
accountability for these refugees, it is politically unwilling to do so.
UNHCR has a surprisingly strong state-like role, under Fukuyama's
framework. Aided by NGOs, UNHCR has stepped forward to provide and
coordinate humanitarian aid in the camps. It must now also assume
responsibility for protecting fundamental human rights.
Because the very state-like functions performed by UNHCR and the
NGOs can in fact exacerbate the conditions that make refugees susceptible
to sexual violence, these organizations must make accountability a priority.
UNHCR and NGOs interact with camp residents on a daily basis,
distributing basic goods and services. The state-like operations of UNHCR
and NGOs create multiple ties between aid providers and beneficiaries.
Poorly-implemented policies can exacerbate the vulnerability of refugee
261. Id. at 10.
262. Id. at 9.
263. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 128, at 240.
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women. Until NGOs and UNHCR are held accountable for their policy
choices, rights-based refuge will remain a mirage.
The trio of aid providers has no structural incentive to collaborate as
one state-like body to provide accountability. Rights-based refuge
"demands a purposeful degree of co-operation,"
264 which is lacking from
this scenario. The state is obliged to provide guarantees of security and
protection of rights. But given Guinea's national security concerns and
deteriorating political stability, the government is unwilling to allow the
aid organizations to take on a particularly political state-like function such
as human rights accountability. 26 Meanwhile, UNHCR and many NGOs
are faced with organizational and structural difficulties that make
institutional change difficult. A collective approach to accountability may
overcome some of these issues. Each organization must be held
accountable for the state-like functions it provides and for the natural
duties of the rights-based approaches it espouses.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The nascent efforts by the trio of aid providers - the Guinean
government, UNHCR, and NGOs - to incorporate human rights norms
into various aspects of refugee assistance are welcome. These efforts lay
the groundwork for addressing violations of refugee women's right to
physical security. A concept of rights-based refuge is central to dissipating
the uncomfortable dynamic of giver and receiver that debases refugee
women.266 Furthermore, rights-based refuge is useful in defining minimum
standards for responses to mass influxes of refugees.
267 However,
incorporation of rights-based norms alone is insufficient to address the
structural vulnerability and continuing rights violations experienced by
these women. Though there are clear obstacles to establishing
accountability mechanisms - among them the objections of participating
states, lack of funding, and the inertia of organizational cultures - rights-
based refuge will remain a hollow promise until such accountability
mechanisms are established.
When rights-based refuge is incorporated into aid responses in name
only, women are disproportionately disadvantaged. Refugee women are
vulnerable to human rights violations in part because of structural defects
in camp design. Rights-based refuge alone, without adequate
accountability mechanisms, does not answer these concerns. Human rights
recognition has historically affected the public sphere more than the
264. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 128, at 229.
265. Cf. id. ("A Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade or a Mullah Ohmar in Kandahar is not
going to permit NGOs to operate as anything but purveyors of charity.").
266. See Sundhya Pahuja, "Don't Just Do Something, Stand There!" Humanitarian Intervention
and the Drowning Stranger (Book Review), 5 HuM. RTs. & HUM. WELFARE 51, 51-53 (2005)
(commenting on the inadequacy of the metaphor of the rescuer).
267. See Clark, supra note 76, at 600.
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private, meaning that women's rights are less easily realized.268 Rights-
based refuge as a guiding principle, rather than a fully-implemented
reality, does not address the bias toward protection of public sphere
human rights inherent in refugee law.269 If humanitarian organizations
choose to re-orient their operations around the recognition of fundamental
rights - as UNHCR and the NGOs, at least, have chosen to do - then they
must also provide women with a mechanism for securing those rights that
extends into the private sphere.
International actors must recognize that the realization of human rights
of refugees cannot be the sole responsibility of host states, and that a multi-
layered accountability system is desperately needed. First, in order to
prevent violations from slipping from view, accountability must flow from
the aid provider to the refugee. Aid providers answer to many
stakeholders, including donors, staff, and their beneficiaries; but all too
often donors are the focus of accountability initiatives.270 UNHCR, for
instance, has a series of accountability mechanisms in place that answer to
the concerns of donors and other UN bodies at the expense of the
individual beneficiary. 271 Accountability mechanisms must be used to
empower women refugees; aid providers must be answerable to their
ultimate customers.
Second, because aid providers have multiple duties - the duty not to
violate and the duty to prevent - an appropriate system of accountability
mechanisms must be responsive to multiple types of complaints. At an
absolute minimum, UNHCR and NGOs must be held responsible for
implementation of their policies minimizing the vulnerability of women
and girl refugees to sexual violence. In 2001, the former High
Commissioner made five commitments to refugee women - including
involvement in food distribution, increased access to camp leadership, and
more effective gender-based violence prevention programs - that could
reduce women's vulnerability to sexual violence.272 Refugee women must
be able to hold UNHCR accountable for the realization of those
commitments. More importantly, however, individual refugee women
must be able to bring complaints, and those complaints must receive
speedy treatment and effective remedies.
Through the SPHERE Project and similar initiatives, NGOs have taken
significant steps towards incorporating rights-based humanitarianism in
refugee operations. Now, they need to follow through on the nascent
268. Copeland, supra note 109, at 106.
269. See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 85, at 17-18 (arguing that women are
disproportionately affected by violations of economic and social rights).
270. Frances Williams, Audit Culture Learns From Corporations' Governance: But
Accountability Must Not Prevent the Real Job from Being Done, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 5, 2005, at
3.
271. See Pallis, supra note 107, at 15-27 (giving a full discussion of the various
accountability mechanisms currently used by UNHCR).
272. UNHCR, REPORT ON THE DIALOGUE WITH REFUGEE WOMEN, supra note 38, at 38-39.
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efforts to create a humanitarian ombudsman that would self-regulate NGO
operations.273 Through an ombudsman, individual refugees could, perhaps
with the help of an independent NGO, register cases against other NGOs.
An ombudsman could be both proactive and reactive,
274 so the process
could help shape policies that effectively meet the concerns of refugee
women. In addition, one NGO-wide ombudsman could help diminish the
negative effects of competition for donor resources by establishing a
framework of comparison across all agencies.
Though NGOs have taken a vital first step, UNHCR is the organization
most desperately in need of an oversight body to provide accountability.
UNHCR faces far more organizational and financial challenges to
instituting effective systems of accountability than the NGOs. An
accountability body for UNHCR would require cooperation across the
international community, and a significant commitment to restructuring
the organizational culture of the Office.
275 Some accountability mechanisms
do already exist, such as the UNHCR-based Evaluation and Policy
Analysis Unit and the UN-wide Office of Internal Oversight Services, but
these do not fundamentally address the lack of beneficiary-based
accountability.
276
In the short term, UNHCR should insist that memoranda of
understanding include realistic provisions for reducing barriers to justice
faced by refugee women, and UNHCR should work with local NGOs to
build capacity and strengthen access to domestic courts. Short-term
changes that could impact UNHCR accountability could take on many
forms, but two in particular come to mind. First, UNHCR could work with
NGOs to participate in an ombudsman system such as that identified by
the SPHERE Project. This would potentially provide individual refugees
with a forum in which to bring complaints. Second, UNHCR can and must
establish external, independent evaluation mechanisms. Independent
audits of UNHCR's protection efforts should be established for each
operation run by UNHCR, and the organization must account publicly for
policy failures resulting in violations of refugees' fundamental rights.
277
In the long term, deeper reform of UNHCR operations is needed in
order to provide accountability for refugee women. UNHCR has a dual
role as both a tool of states and a defender of individual rights.
278 Any
273. See HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY PARTNERSHIP, HUMANITARIAN OMBUDSMAN
PROJECr: VISION/ MISSION STATEMENT, (Sept. 22,1999), available at www.hapinternational.org/
hapgeneva/OMBUDSMAN/STATEMEN.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2006); John Mitchell &
Deborah Doane, An Ombudsman for Humanitarian Assistance? 23(2) DISASTERS 115 (1999).
274. Mitchell & Doane, supra note 273, at 118.
275. See Harrell-Bond, supra note 174, at 71 (discussing the dysfunctional organizational
culture of humanitarian organizations).
276. See Pallis, supra note 107, at 15-27 (giving a full review of UNHCR accountability
mechanisms).




Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 9 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol9/iss1/2
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
effective long-term accountability mechanisms must incorporate the
interests of both these groups. UNHCR's operational policies need to be
revised in order to give the organization the capacity to protect individual
rights in situations of mass influxes where the host government may try to
limit refugee rights.279 UNHCR's dual role - encompassing both refugee
protection and state compliance with the Convention - makes promoting
human rights norms more complicated, and so the mandate must be
revised or clarified so that participating states fully understand and
anticipate the organization's commitment to individual rights.280 Finally,
the Convention must be authoritatively interpreted or rewritten in order to
clarify the role of human rights norms in refugee protection.281
Accountability and access to justice are crucial if the incorporation of
human rights in refugee protection is to be more than just a hollow gesture.
Women are subject to systematic violations of their human rights, despite
the rights-based rhetoric employed by aid providers. Aid providers in
Guinea and elsewhere must realize that their state-like functioning and
their rights-based rhetoric should be accompanied by refugee-driven
accountability mechanisms. Women's rights violations are central
problems in long-term refugee camps in Guinea and in many other places.
Without addressing these systemic violations through accountability and
access to justice, rights-based refuge will remain incomplete.
279. See Clark, supra note 76, at 595-99.
280. Loescher, UNHCR at Fifty, supra note 37, at 4-5 (discussing the political problems
inherent in UNHCR's conflicting double mandate).
281. Clark, supra note 76, at 585-86.
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